Managing Take Control
An assessment of the Namibian HIV & AIDS media campaign and its coordination

Prepared by
Bastian Schwarz
for
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Directorate Print Media
UNICEF Namibia, Adolescent HIV Prevention Programme

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1. Introduction

Background & rationale

Namibia’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) has been the Government key player in the country’s HIV & AIDS communication and an important partner of UNICEF and other UN agencies in fighting the epidemic.

Since 1999, when the UN Theme Group on HIV & AIDS and the Ministry’s leadership pushed for the establishment of the Task Force for the Namibian HIV & AIDS Media Campaign, MIB has officially been the coordinating body for the Take Control campaign. Since 2002, the Ministry is housing and running the campaign secretariat.

MIB’s lead role in Namibia’s HIV & AIDS communication efforts is firmly cemented in the latest version of the National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan – Medium Term Plan III (MTP III) as well as in the country’s proposal to the Global Fund against HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB (Global Fund). Within the Ministry, HIV & AIDS communication is placed under the Population IEC project and mainly managed by the Directorate Print Media and Regional Offices (Directorate PM) with support of the Directorate Audiovisual Media (AVM).

Yet, while its role as communication link to national efforts to curb HIV & AIDS is anchored in Namibia’s cross sectoral action plans, MIB has not yet entirely taken on all the responsibilities involved. This has been mainly due to constraints in available resources at the Directorate PM. As a consequence, UNICEF as the ministry’s key partner in this field of national HIV & AIDS communication has continued to perform some important campaign management functions, such as the development of campaign IEC and mass media materials as well as the handling of the Take Control warehouse. Specifically regarding the latter, there is also support from the National Youth Council (NYC).

With monies provided through the Global Fund, expected to be available in the third quarter of the year, MIB is, however, expecting to increase its capacities to an extent that will allow it to manage the campaign more independently and efficiently.

To assist this process, an assessment was conducted to identify shortcomings in the past and current management as well as in the outputs of the Take Control campaign. Also, a consultative process was started with the team at the Directorate PM to explore ways how MIB could realistically address such shortcomings in the near future and how UNICEF could help.

In its three parts, the paper thus provides background information on campaign management needs and capacities. It also presents some ideas how a more comprehensive and improved management of Take Control at MIB can be achieved. It is hoped that this information can offer valuable input for later discussion and decision-making processes and ultimately contribute to making Take Control a continued success.
2. Process and Method

*What was done and how it was done*

The goal of this exercise was to identify strengths and weaknesses in the management of the *Take Control* media campaign. It also aimed to explore how - in line with the capacities of MIB’s Directorate PM and its key funding partner UNICEF - its management can be improved to meet the needs and expectations of campaign partners and target groups.

To achieve these goals, a three-step process was followed:

- **As a first step, an outside evaluation of *Take Control* was undertaken.** An external view of the campaign and its management was thought to be the best way to find out about what key areas for improvement would have to be. Together with management at the Directorate PM and based upon a review of actual task force attendance over the past three years, a number of key partners in *Take Control* were selected. Additionally, important stakeholders in and for HIV & AIDS communication were identified regardless of their participation in *Take Control*. In the end, three groups of stakeholders were chosen to give feedback: organisations and institutions that implement programmes in the field of HIV/AIDS (mainly NGO’s, FBO’s and Government agencies), media organisations and key donors of *Take Control*. Representatives of the selected organisations were then asked in semi-structured interviews about their perceptions, expectations, experiences and suggestions for improvement regarding *Take Control*. During this phase, a total of 28 persons representing 19 organisations were interviewed (*for a complete listing of interviewees, see annex*). Additional feedback from outside partners was sought during a Task Force meeting on April 1, 2004. First results were presented and added input from the larger forum encouraged.

- **During the second phase, campaign management was scrutinized from within MIB.** Staff was interviewed to find out about how the Directorate PM was and is handling the campaign. The consultant also investigated what the current capacities (and capacity gaps) in MIB are that affect *Take Control*. Interviews were complemented by a review of documentation regarding funding, management and personnel structures, mission statements, earlier assessments and other relevant materials. The collection of information in this phase was loosely guided by the indicators for the assessment of capacity developed by *Development Alternatives Inc.* (DAI). In line with the goal of developing an improved campaign management structure, the analysis, focused on the subdivision responsible for campaigns but also took a look at support services (stock, supply, distribution) and the publications section.

- **As a third step, campaign management needs and capacities were contrasted.** Based on this comparison, a consultative process was started during which the consultant together with the team at the Directorate PM identified priority areas for action and ways to meet the most pressing campaign management needs.
The document is divided in three parts, that reflect this work process: Part I focuses on the Take Control outside assessment while the second part investigates capacities within the Directorate PM. Part III integrates results from the two previous sections and reports on the proposed actions that were developed.

*Research constraints*

During the outside assessment of Take Control received only reluctant support of key actor NACOP (National AIDS Coordination Programme) at the Ministry of Health and Social Services (MOHSS). As the organisation was the midst of preparations for the launch of MTP III, it proved difficult to schedule a meeting within the 6-week interview period. However, representatives that eventually took part in a meeting set up through inter-government channels unfortunately also did not see the benefit of the exercise. They were reluctant to talk and at times outright hostile. Input from this key actor was therefore limited. However, this might also be a reflection of the generally little cooperation between the two ministries that has been identified as one of the problems of *Take Control* in this paper.

Also, the representative of the Council of Churches of Namibia that used to work with Take Control had unfortunately left the organisation. Therefore, her experiences could not be tapped. This left the FBO’s somewhat underrepresented. This was at least partially compensated by the presence and input of some FBO partners during the feedback session.
3. Background
A brief history of Take Control

The Task Force for the Take Control Namibian HIV & AIDS Media Campaign was established in 1999 based on the goals formulated in the second National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS (MTP II). The document had identified responsibilities of the various public and private sectors in the fight against HIV & AIDS. However, while it was thought as a multi-sectoral approach, MTP II did lack input from line ministries and in the end, the plan continued to rely heavily on the structures of MOHSS and NACOP. As a consequence, many line ministries did not take ownership of the plan and only few ministries - among them MIB – lived up to their sectoral commitments.

One of the priority strategies of MTP II was the prevention of HIV infection through information, education and communication (IEC). However, the document is ambiguous in assigning sectoral responsibility for communication work: On one side, a leadership role of MOHSS/NACOP is envisaged with Health to produce and disseminate IEC materials and to assist all other sectors to do likewise. On the other hand, a major chunk of tasks regarding information work was assigned to the sector “Information, Broadcasting and Mass Media” and its key actor, MIB.

In reality, leadership in HIV & AIDS communication was soon taken on by MIB. The United Nations’ Theme Group on HIV/AIDS supported this as MIB was considered a more natural partner for media work and its leadership under Ben Amathila was supportive of quickly establishing a coordinating body for a communication response. To a certain extent, there might also have been intentions to bypass the structures of MOHSS that were also overloaded with HIV & AIDS related issues that one key informant described as “obstructive”. Yet, during the following establishment of Take Control, NACOP and MOHSS remained involved:

After a series of workshops and meetings with media practitioners, NGO’s and other stakeholders, the Task Force for the Namibian HIV & AIDS Media Campaign was launched by then Minister of Information and Broadcasting Ben Amathila late in 1999. The Task Force’s first chair was NBC’s Jimmy Amupala joined by coordinator Rianne Selle from the MIB’s Directorate PM. It was to become a link between media organisations, Government agencies and NGO’s and was tasked to create a national media campaign under the slogan Take Control.

While initially the UN Theme Group on HIV & AIDS had advocated the formation of a coordinating body for HIV & AIDS communication, UNICEF’s role became more prominent in the following years. This was mainly because the mandate of Take Control fit with UNICEF’s Adolescent HIV Prevention Programme’s (AHPP) media communication component. In fact, UNICEF actually was housing and running the secretariat of the campaign during its first years until it eventually migrated to MIB in 2002. UNICEF also became - and remains - the key funding source for Take Control. Initially, UNICEF supported the production of campaign materials through both MIB and the MOHSS IEC unit, but with the virtual collapse of the IEC Unit in 2003, the role of MOHSS was diminished. For 2004, UNICEF is only cooperating with MIB on Take Control.
MIB, however, also has gone through major changes since the inception of the campaign: Most importantly, it was briefly merged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information and Broadcasting (MFAIB). Leadership also changed repeatedly with the President himself taking over at one time in 2002. Under Nujoma, MIB became, once again, an independent Ministry. However, the Ministry had, not benefited from the brief marriage. In fact, MIB’s capacities were severely eroded during the merger. Specifically, the administrative structure of the Ministry had been drained as staff from finance, personnel and supply units was eager to move into better paid Foreign Affairs positions where they remained after the split. MFAIB’s leadership had also displayed little interest in the former MIB’s work (with the exception of NBC related matters), effectively leaving the Directorates PM and AVM without real leadership during that time.

Despite all of this, the MIB Directorate Print Media had by 2003 not only taken on full responsibility for Take Control but was also still running the UNFPA sponsored Population IEC project. The project had been with MIB since 1996 and had been moved from the Directorate AVM to the Directorate PM to create synergies between the two UN-supported projects. The move was, however, also motivated by the level of activity around Take Control at the Directorate PM:

After all, the campaign had established the brand Take Control among Namibian youth and successfully raised HIV & AIDS awareness and basic knowledge levels. The Task Force had established working contacts with 40 organisations and attendance levels were rising from an average of 11 partners in 2001 to 16 in 2003. However, also in 2003, Jimmy Amupala laid down its chairmanship, effectively leaving state broadcaster NBC unrepresented. MIB Director Rianne Selle took over and recently was joined by National Youth Council General Secretary Pohamba Shifeta as co-chair.

While MIB as the official campaign coordinator successfully supervised the production of an ambitious World AIDS Day programme by Take Control NGO partner Ombetja Yehinga, the production of most IEC and mass media campaign materials still was handled by UNICEF in the absence of sufficient staff at MIB. The staff situation worsened between 2003 and early 2004 with resignations in both the Take Control and Population IEC projects.

At the same time, MIB has, however, become the main implementing agency for social mobilisation and communication work under Namibia’s Global Fund proposal. Hopes are that the staff component of the Global Fund as well as the filling of vacancies within the Directorate PM will allow MIB to take the next steps towards assuming full coordination of the campaign.
Part I:
Take Control
An Outside Assessment
4. Take Control: Outside Assessment  
*Partners & stakeholders view of Take Control*

It is the declared goal of the *Take Control* Task Force to involve as many stakeholders from the field of HIV & AIDS as possible. In fact, the Task Force derives much of its legitimacy from the large number of partners that have been involved over the years. Yet, despite the swollen ranks of Task Force partners, a withdrawal of certain key partners as well as a tendency to sporadic and lower level representation can be observed.

Against this background - and since the initiative remains a partnership-driven and multi-sectoral effort - *Take Control* partners were interviewed about what they thought had been going well and, more importantly, what needed to be improved with the campaign and its coordination.

The goal was to find out how NGO, government, media, and funding partners perceived the campaign, what they thought about the outputs of *Take Control*, how they evaluated work mechanisms and the role of MIB and UNICEF in the campaign. The exercise also aimed to find out more about what partners expected from *Take Control* and what could be done to meet these expectations.

The results of a total of 19 partner interviews and input received during the feedback session are presented below.

4.1 Perceptions of Take Control  
*What is Take Control?*

The *Take Control* Task Force describes itself as a decision-making and coordinating body for the national HIV & AIDS media campaign. This meant initially that the Task Force was responsible to initiate and supervise the development and running of a national campaign aimed at the general public. Traditionally, the Task Force also took on the coordination of related national events, namely the World AIDS Day activities. Aside from that, the Task Force was to offer a forum for media organisations, NGO’s and Government agencies to share information and to coordinate activities around HIV & AIDS education and communication. As a multi-sectoral initiative, *Take Control* was to be the sum of its part(ner)s.

During the interviews, it was attempted to find out whether the perceptions that key partners have of *Take Control* correspond with how the initiative sees itself. It was asked what partners thought was the purpose and mandate of *Take Control* and whether they felt that the initiative represented a veritable national effort which they felt part of. It soon became clear that outside perceptions differed quite significantly from what *Take Control* intended to be.
Talk shop Take Control

The Take Control Task Force was not seen by anyone as a decision-making and only by few as a coordinating body. There was wide agreement that the Task Force was at best an information sharing and discussion forum. Some coordinating power was conceded specifically with regard to the organisation of World AIDS Day events.

While all partners appreciated this forum exists, many felt that the Task Force is “all talk and no action”. There was a general feeling that while partners present activities in the Task Force, they tend to follow their own agendas without any serious will to coordinate with or contribute to national campaign efforts.

Ownership

Given the fact that the Task Force is to be partner driven, it is of concern that none of the key partners interviewed felt that it was actually them who made up Take Control.

When queried, it became clear that most partners initially saw Take Control as a UNICEF project. With UNICEF toning down its often dominant role in the initiative, some partners now await that American NGO’s would be eager to fill that gap as the view prevailed that those who bring the money run Take Control. Some of the less veteran partners see Take Control as a Government initiative - but it seems that they strongly link the project with the person of its chairwomen Rianne Selle but are sceptical in how far there is veritable support from Government for the campaign.

The perceived lack of official endorsement and the high profile that outside partners such as UNICEF have had for a long time affect the legitimacy Take Control’s as the national campaign for the general population on HIV & AIDS.

Legitimacy

Partners have not only questioned the lack of support extended to the campaign from MIB. There were also doubts, whether the lead agency in the national response to HIV & AIDS, MOHSS was supporting the initiative wholeheartedly. In fact, cooperation of Take Control with MOHSS is not much different from that with any other partner. This is relevant since many felt that MIB alone could not lend sufficient legitimacy to Take Control as a national campaign and that the backing of MOHSS was essential.

Lack of ownership by partners and legitimacy in general are reflected by the fact that even close Take Control partners most of the time decide not to feature the campaign’s logo on their IEC or media materials (despite having been repeatedly encouraged to do so). They simply do not feel part of the campaign and donors are more interested in seeing their own logos than supporting a national campaign that had not even asserted itself convincingly as such.
Terms of reference

While the Task Force had started out with the clear objective to get the first HIV & AIDS media campaign off the ground, interviews indicated that by now even veteran partners are confused as to what the Task Force’s mandate is and what Take Control is to achieve.

“Take Control needs to communicate clearer who they are, what they do and how they differ from the many other bodies and committees.”
(NGO partner)

There is not only confusion about the mandate and authority of the body. To many, it is also not quite what the core activities and responsibilities of Take Control are. The result is a situation where many partners do not know what their role is - or could be - in the scheme. This holds especially true for the media partners interviewed and for organisations, which have joined Take Control at a later stage. But even the representative of a veteran Take Control partner felt:

“The main objective and the mandate of Take Control are still not clear to me. It seems that most things are done on an ad hoc basis with a lack of strategy and foresight.”
(NGO partner)

Expectations and suggestions

Virtually all partners interviewed agreed that there is need for a clear definition of Take Control’s mandate, its responsibilities and its core activities:

“Take Control needs to take control of itself.”
(NGO partner)

Most partners expected Take Control to take the lead in the formulation of national communication strategies with full support of Government through MOHSS/NACOP and MIB. Take Control would then be tasked by the main decision-making bodies on the national response to HIV & AIDS – NAEC was mentioned - to coordinate key national communication activities and ensure unified messaging at national level. It was said that this would also mean that Take Control partners should not shy away from seeking agreement on core messages. This refers specifically to the competing interpretations of the ABC of prevention by FBO’s and secular partners, the recurrent discussions of which during Task Force meetings is seen as obstructive by many partners.

Partners were unanimous, however, that the Take Control should not become an implementing body or a production house, but rather concentrate on taking leadership in formulating joint strategies and overseeing and guiding implementation. Some partners indicated that they would consider linking up with national communication thrusts if decision-making on strategies were participatory and timely. Most, however, made clear that attempts to influence the autonomous programming and related media production of single partners (that is often tailored to highly specialised target groups)
would be counter-productive. Take Control should not become a clearinghouse for targeted materials but rather concentrate on national activities such as World AIDS Day and the national media campaign.

Media partners quite simply hoped for a clearer definition of their role within the campaign.

4.2 The Campaign

_Evaluation of strategy and outputs_

With the campaign going into its fifth year, partners were also asked to comment on how they felt about strategic direction of the campaign as well as about _Take Control’s_ outputs. The feedback received centred around the most recent World AIDS Day events coordinated through Take Control and on the media campaign. There were also a number of general issues discussed.

_General feedback: No sense of direction_

**Lack of strategy:** The key criticism that surfaced across discussions was the lack of a coherent communication strategy to guide the campaign. Accordingly, there was not one partner that could pinpoint what the campaign had been trying to achieve in the recent past.

“The campaign is in need of a clear vision and direction. There are too many topics and isolated activities, the focus is lost and, ultimately, the point is missed.”

(Funding partner)

While some older partners knew that the campaign initially tried to break up taboos around condom use and targeted explicitly young people, none of the partners could pinpoint what the following phases of the campaign were about (parents, regionalisation and activation).

This was attributed to the piecemeal approach in the campaign. The feeling prevailed that most activities were done on an _ad hoc_ basis, either because money was available or as a matter of routine. In the partners’ eyes, there was no clear focus on achievable communication goals for a set period of time. Instead, _Take Control_ tried to accommodate a wide variety of topics, none of which was communicated thoroughly enough to actually come through. The result was foggy messaging that obviously confused target groups and partner organisations alike.

**Involvement of young people and PLWHA:** Various partners felt that campaign activities lacked input from important target groups. Specifically, youth and people living with HIV & AIDS (PLWHA) were singled out: Regarding young people, there was some concern that _Take Control_ was an example of top-down communication with old people telling young people what to do.
Similarly, it was felt by some that *Take Control* had focused too much on prevention, neglecting the needs of the considerable amount of Namibian PLWHA:

“Take Control has only prevention messages and nothing for the large group that lives with the HIV. But the promotion of a positive outlook on the future and of responsible behaviour by those that carry the virus is as important.”

(NGO partner)

The lack of input from the ground often resulted in communication that was seen far-fetched and out of touch with people’s realities.

**Appropriateness of messages:** Among respondents from the public sector, some concern was voiced regarding the explicitness of some messages. They pointed out that materials needed to be developed and disseminated with the age of the recipients and communities’ sensibilities in mind. Official endorsement of *Take Control* messages was very important to this group. Overall, more cultural sensitivity of messages was thought necessary.

**World AIDS Day: “Who got that?”**

A number of partners commented on the recent 2003 World AIDS Day activities when asked about their opinion on *Take Control* outputs. While much of the feedback centred on participation and joint-decision making (see below), there was also some criticism on content and style of the activities:

Even though the events were praised for their quality and professional organisation, some partners felt that activities did not manage to reach out beyond activists and a small crowd of people that already had high levels of awareness. The concern was that events had in effect been “by educators for educators” and were detached from most Namibians’ tastes and needs.

**The media campaign: Failing to go to the next level**

While there were strong opinions on the most recent World AIDS Day, there was less feedback on the latest campaign materials that had been launched simultaneously. This might be because the development of these new materials had been handled almost exclusively by UNICEF with very little involvement of the Task Force.

It surfaced that most partners liked the *Take Control* “Hero” theme, but were not convinced by the way it had been implemented. While the high quality of new materials was acknowledged, opinions on content and style were split: Some felt that the visual attractiveness caught attention and that the focus on clear and simple messages was powerful (with exception of a TV Spot on stigma which was not understood at all). Others thought that campaign materials did not effectively back up the “Hero” theme and specifically criticised that the materials cut off the faces of the models.

The new set of information materials was, however, received very positively by all partners that actually used *Take Control* materials in their work.
Looking at earlier stages of the campaign, the media component also did not escape criticism of being detached:

“You see athletes and educated, successful people in the campaign. This has led to a feeling that these people cannot get HIV and their role is only to warn us others. A representation of normal, poor or HIV positive people is completely lacking.”
(NGO partner)

During the feedback session with the Task Force, two Regional AIDS Coordinators underscored once more the need for more regionally adapted material. In this context, the short *Take Control* dramas shot in various regions found positive mentioning. On the other hand, the *Speak Out* series featuring politicians was seen as patronising and not very attractive. Also, some partners felt that while *Take Control* had succeeded in its early stages to spread awareness and contribute to the acceptance of condoms among Namibians, it had thus far failed to take the campaign to the next level of motivating action.

A representative of a FBO’s urged to be more careful with the general messaging and specifically felt that the print adaptations of the regional dramas reduced women to sex objects. It was urged to create messages that addressed underlying issues and went beyond calls for safer sex.

*Expectations and suggestions*

Suggestions for improvement of the campaign outputs mostly referred to the need to develop a clear and focused communication strategy. This would give the campaign a direction and hold the various activities together. Next to a long-term strategy, it was suggested to annually develop a plan in which partners agreed on what the key communication goals would be for that particular year. If this was done in a consultative and participatory process and was realistic and focused, such a process would strengthen the involvement of partners as well as the effectiveness of the national campaign.

Also, it was urged to find ways to stronger involve PLWHA and youth in the campaign development process. The National Youth Council felt that it could assist with a link to the youth through its links to member organisations at the grassroots level. It was also urged to strengthen input from the regions and to provide regionally relevant and translated materials.

Partners also urged to pre-test materials more thoroughly and to evaluate impacts critically and regularly.
4.3 The Task Force

Evaluation of Take Control work mechanisms

The Take Control Task Force was created as a link between Government agencies, NGO’s and media organisations and has involved a wide variety of partners. This section examines how the campaign is interacting with its many partners and what the key problems in this interaction are.

The Task Force meetings: “A waste of time”?

The one formal mechanism of Take Control designed to bring all partners together are the Task Force meetings. They are open to everyone and take place every first Thursday of the month in the offices of the Directorate PM. The Task Force has been a forum of inclusiveness that has brought together a wide variety of stakeholders in HIV & AIDS education and prevention. As pointed out earlier, there has been an increase in nominal attendance to these meetings over the years. At the same time, however, important partners - especially from the media - have withdrawn and there are indications that other key partners are deprioritising the meetings by seconding lower level staff to attend the meetings. Also, there is a high fluctuation of persons and organisations attending which affects the continuity of cooperation through the body. To get a clearer picture, the interviews investigated on what partners thought about this work mechanism and what might be going wrong.

With the resignation of Jimmy Amupala from NBC and as chair of the Task Force the representation of media organisations in the meetings has virtually ceased. It has already been noted that many media partners do not really understand their role in the campaign and this surely has contributed to the withdrawal. Yet, the format of the Task Force meetings is also not conducive to attracting media practitioners:

One media partner described the lack of media participation in the Take Control mechanisms as the result of a “clash between civil service and private enterprise culture”. In fact, all media partners interviewed did not feel that the Task Force meetings are worth their while. They pointed to the fact that the meetings were not action-oriented and most of the topics discussed were not relevant to media anyhow. Media representatives felt that they would get more out of a personal meeting with a campaign representative to discuss specific issues relevant to the media organisation in a result-oriented manner.

Other organisations also felt meetings were not always worth attending. While NGO’s, donors and Government partners might be more willing to tolerate lengthy meetings, some still expressed that the Task Force meetings are “a waste of time”. The key criticism is, again, that meetings are not action-oriented. Partners blame this on the size of the group that stifles fruitful discussion, not to speak of effective decision-making.
At the same time, staff shortages are a reality for many organisations. As a result, organisations have to prioritise what meetings are most relevant and useful. The Task Force meeting is often not considered important as other obligations as many partners do not really know what they get out of the meetings. Many also feel that they cannot really partake in decision-making about the campaign through this channel. Obviously, there are two main issues hampering performance of the Task Force: For one, the forum itself is too large too really allow for action-oriented meetings. Also, participating organisations feel that they do not have influence on the campaign and do not know in how far they actually profit from the exercise. Both issues have been further scrutinized.

The media and events subcommittees: “Didn’t work”-ing groups

It has been recognised quite early that the large group of the general Task Force meeting complicated action-oriented work processes. Therefore, UNICEF insisted as early as 2001 on the formation of subcommittees that would bring together a limited number of key players in the areas of events and media in working groups. Both subcommittees were, however, discontinued in mid-2003 upon request of the responsible officials at MIB. What had happened?

Partner interviews indicate that there were a number of factors that caused these subcommittees to fail:

From the very start, subcommittees had not managed to enlist the commitment of relevant members. For instance, the media subcommittee was hardly ever attended by media organisations (apart from NBC in the person of chairman Jimmy Amupala) and the organisations with larger media communication components. Similarly, the events committee failed to ensure veritable cooperation with key partners such as NACOP. Instead, it was noted, the committees often included members that had no real expertise in the fields of communication or event management and thus never managed to turn into effective working groups.

Additionally, the role of UNICEF had also contributed to the failure of the subcommittees to some extent. On one hand, the agency was the driving force behind the subcommittees. But on the other hand UNICEF tended to emphasise their role as key donor of Take Control and often made little attempt to seek veritable participation in the meetings, simply presenting to the subcommittees what was to be done anyway. But UNICEF’s dominance apparently led not only to a withdrawal of partners because they felt they had no real say but also because the other members leaned back feeling that things were being taken care of by the agency.

It also appears that the groups would have needed a more proactive management to motivate members to come together, preparing meetings and following up on action. But yet again, a lack of participation and influence on decision-making had also contributed to the problems.
Participation and decision-making: No taking part in Take Control

Many partners do not know what they can get out of Take Control. Initial expectations seem to have been quite different: Among some private media partners, there had been an initial expectation to get advertising bookings out of Take Control. While this expectation has been replaced by a more general sense of responsibility to contribute to HIV communication, they still are looking for ways to make cooperation mutually beneficial, be it through reduced advertising rates, exclusive stories and promotions or even mere public acknowledgement of their support.

Obviously, Take Control’s capacities to support partner activities with funds or services are limited and especially in cooperation with the private sector, creativity is needed. Yet, the largest part of partners works not for profit. For these partners, the forum initially was to be a channel to give input on national campaigns and events and to create synergies in these areas.

However, it appears that Take Control and its mechanisms are meeting these expectations as little as it has met those of the private media: Work processes are not seen as participatory by all partners surveyed. In fact, partners do not feel that they have any influence on the core activities that take place under the banner of Take Control and that relevant decisions are taken “behind the scenes”. The Task Force meetings are only seen as a forum for partners to endorse what has already been decided. Additionally, especially representatives from FBO’s felt that critical input is often brushed aside by the chair. During the feedback session, it was in fact reported that FBO’s tended to consider the Task Force a “hostile environment” for faith-based approaches to HIV & AIDS communication.

When asked who was calling the shots in Take Control, partners’ answers varied: Some felt that Take Control was dancing to the tune of the main donors’ agendas (initially UNICEF, increasingly American money). Others thought that certain individuals heavily involved in the campaign - such as the campaign’s chairwoman Rianne Selle or World AIDS Day coordinator Philippe Talavera - made the decisions. As a result, some of the participants new to Take Control were not sure whether their input was actually in demand and, accordingly, hesitant to contribute.

But criticism was not solely directed at the Task Force: Partners also pointed out that the general motivation to actively participate in meetings as well as in smaller working groups or to support Take Control activities was low. After all, active participation in Take Control activities would mean extra - and unpaid work - for the individuals involved and in the end only few members were willing to make firm commitments to voluntary working groups.

This was at times coupled with a lack of understanding about media communication or event production that at times resulted in unrealistic expectations of what work is involved and at what point decisions have to be taken to ensure successful implementation.
As could be observed during the implementation, this results in a situation where teams that have taken on coordination of campaign activities have to walk a tightrope between participation and the need to effectively organise their tasks.

*Communicating with the partners: Too much is too little*

In the light of unsteady attendance, effective flow of communication from *Take Control* to partners is of special importance. Key channels to inform partners have been the sharing of minutes, e-mail notifications through the chairperson and, with the support of the DED development worker, increasingly personal networking.

Yet, partners do not rate communication with *Take Control* as very good: The minutes obviously are a format that many do not feel encouraged to read. This is mainly because it is difficult for partners to quickly filter out information relevant to them. Communication via e-mail is even seen as counterproductive by many: It was repeatedly pointed out that the barrage of e-mails sent (often not directly related to the campaign) makes it impossible to distinguish what is of immediate relevance and what is not. Some partners have resorted to simply deleting all incoming e-mails. The current form of e-mailing is thus confusing and actually detracts attention from the important information about the campaign.

None of the partners interviewed commented on the personal networking attempts, but from discussions with the development worker it appears that this is, in fact, the most successful way to motivate partners to involve partners.

*Expectations and suggestions*

Media partners had the clearest idea how cooperation with *Take Control* could be improved. As they did not see the current Task Force forum meeting their needs, they suggested assigning a steady press officer who would assist the media with classic PR work and would concentrate on media advocacy to improve coverage on HIV & AIDS. That person would also filter and relay information about the campaign. Collaboration with the health reporters’ network was proposed to brief media workers on key issues and offer forums for discussion with experts. Meetings would only be called when there was good reason - for instance ahead of intensification campaigns to discuss media involvement. However, as a first step a clear understanding of what *Take Control* and media partners expected from each other was seen as necessary.

NGO and funding partners hoped for more participatory work mechanisms. It was pointed out, however, that one would have to define how much participation and joint decision-making was actually desirable. In the interest of maintaining a fairly flexible working structure, decisions should be made in a consultative manner but leadership was in the end needed.

A joint strategy for *Take Control* was seen by many as the first step to more cohesion. Suggestions were that *Take Control* should develop a communication strategy on an annual basis. The development process would be consultative and could be facilitated by MIB. The Task Force then would make a joint recommendation for the
communication goals of the year to an official executive body. Several partners indicated that this could be the National AIDS Executive Committee (NAEC) that was composed of all key stakeholders from Government and the donor community. This approved strategic work-plan would then be the basis on which Take Control would implement its core activities and which would allow partners to assess in how far they can coordinate their activities with the campaign. In the process, ownership and legitimacy would be strengthened.

Some partners also felt that participation and ownership could further be boosted by communicating campaign achievements – and the contribution of partners to those achievements – more effectively.

Several partners also felt that ways to accommodate more input from concerned groups such as young people and PLWHA as well as experiences from the field and from the regions would have to be found.

4.4 MIB, UNICEF and Take Control

The role of the MIB and UNICEF in the campaign

The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and UNICEF have been key players in Take Control since its inception, one as the coordinating government body and the other as the principal funding partner. It was therefore evaluated what partners thought the role of both agencies in the campaign had been and what it should be in the future.

UNICEF: Dominator to integrator

For a long time Take Control has been equated with UNICEF and even today, some people continue to believe that the national HIV & AIDS media campaign is an activity of the organisations Adolescent HIV Prevention Programme. This has been mainly due to the large role that UNICEF had taken on itself early in the campaign. After all, the Take Control secretariat was housed at the agencies offices for the first years. Also, UNICEF was the main and at times virtually sole funding agency for Take Control activities.

Partners have criticised UNICEF’s role as they feel that it has diminished ownership of the campaign within the counterpart ministry as well as among other stakeholders. On the other hand, it has been acknowledged that UNICEF’s strong involvement has made - and still continues to make - things happen. Yet, at this stage, most partners welcome that UNICEF has handed over more responsibility to MIB and a few already acknowledged that there were now genuine attempts to integrate stakeholders in Take Control.

MIB: The fractured backbone

As UNICEF has sought to normalise its involvement in Take Control, MIB had to take on more responsibility in the campaign. This is reflected by the fact that some of the newer partners already perceive MIB as the key actor in the campaign. This is an
important step for MIB to be recognised as the coordinating and facilitating backbone of the campaign.

While most partners believe that MIB is the natural place in the administration to coordinate Take Control, there are also reservations. These concern mainly the capacity of MIB to handle a campaign of this size with its current resources and amount of high level support: As pointed out above, many partners see that the Take Control workload has to be almost exclusively shouldered by the chairperson who, as a consequence, is at times overwhelmed. It is questioned whether Government will acknowledge the lack of capacities and – in face of the tight budgeting – provide much needed funds to strengthen MIB and the Directorates PM and AVM.

Funding partners, again, have voiced reasonable doubt whether the depleted structures of MIB will be sufficient to handle even more outside funds and implementation challenges.

Still, most partners believe that the campaign needs official endorsement and ultimately has to be carried by Government. And within Government, most partners prefer MIB as MOHSS is seen as lacking understanding of media work and low on action as it is already overloaded with a host of other responsibilities in the field of HIV & AIDS. At the same time, partners stress, however, that Take Control at MIB will need the full backing of MOHSS. There was concern among the interviewed that rivalry instead of cooperation might be developing between the two ministries.

In a minority opinion, one partner noted that in general the culture of the public service might be detrimental to the running of effective campaigns: more institutional flexibility would be needed, including flexible working hours, flat hierarchies and simplified decision-making processes.

*Expectations and suggestions*

In principle, partners accepted the role of MIB as coordinator of the campaign, but urged for a closer cooperation with MOHSS in general, and with NACOP in particular. The view prevailed that MIB should be a “communication service provider” to MOHSS/NACOP. Additionally, MIB would have to advocate stronger leadership support at for HIV & AIDS communication. It was perceived positively that UNICEF was increasingly handing over responsibilities to MIB in handling the campaign.

However, in the face of low capacities at MIB as well as because of perceived restrictions of effective campaign work within “heavy” government structures, several partners also suggested to consider an establishment of campaign management mechanisms that had full endorsement but actually operated outside the structures of the public administration.
4.5 Summary and Discussion

During the outside analysis, Take Control has been acknowledged for actually getting a communication response off the ground and scoring successes such as the promotion of condom acceptance, the rising of awareness and knowledge levels. The initiative was also hailed for its inclusiveness: It has managed to bring together stakeholders in HIV & AIDS from a large variety and facilitates the open sharing of information between them.

During the interviews, there were, however, also a number of challenges that the Take Control campaign is currently facing identified.

Key problems of Take Control

A lack of legitimacy: Even though Take Control has established itself as the only national media campaign on HIV & AIDS, partners have questioned the backing of the campaign from key entities such as MOHSS/NACOP and even MIB’s own leadership. Also, Take Control has in the past been strongly associated with UNICEF, and this might have been detrimental for the initiative to establish itself as the official Namibian HIV & AIDS media campaign.

A lack of ownership by partners: However, not only veritable backing from Government appears to be lacking: Despite rising attendance figures in the Task Force, interviews yielded that hardly any partner sees itself as a true part of Take Control. Given that Take Control derives much of its justification from its broad base of organisations involved, this is worrying. Partners report that their reluctance to truly link with Take Control is mainly due to little participatory decision-making.

A lack of a clear mandate and strategy: Even veteran Take Control partners are not entirely sure what precisely the tasks and responsibilities of the initiative are. There is also no clear understanding of what Take Control’s core activities are. In turn, many partners - specifically among the media - do not know what their role in the Task Force should or could be. Closely related, partners do not know what strategy is being followed since the completion of the first phase of the campaign. To most, Take Control’s activities appear ad hoc, donor driven and not coherent.

A lack of campaign management and communication: The key management tool of Take Control, the monthly Task Force meeting, is not sufficient to ensure effective coordination, discussion and joint decision-making. Some partners in fact feel that they are “a waste of time” and as a consequence attendance patterns show little continuity with key decision-makers increasingly absent. There is a feeling that the key figures in the campaign are overwhelmed with the workload and do not manage to run effective working groups or to provide concise and relevant information to partners.
A lack of input from target groups/limited regional input and appeal: Take Control was urged to find better ways to better involve key target groups such as young people but also PLWHA in the campaign. Also, the reach and the appeal of messages in the regions are not sufficient. It was felt that the campaign was thus at times out of touch with the realities of its audiences.

A lack of monitoring and evaluation: It was pointed out that Take Control spent too little time on pre-testing materials and on evaluating the impacts of its activities.

Based on these challenges, priority areas of action can be formulated:

Priority areas for action and recommendations

Priority 1 - Strengthen official endorsement:
Even though Take Control is de facto the only national HIV & AIDS media campaign, its official clout needs to be strengthened. This would improve the overall acceptance of Take Control as the lead initiative in communication on HIV & AIDS for the general public.

To achieve this, there would be a need for a stronger and more outspoken commitment of Government leadership – led by MIB and MOHSS/NACOP - to the campaign. It might be considered to lobby high-level representatives of both ministries to formally and jointly become patrons of Take Control to heighten the campaigns profile while the chairpersons would continue to deal with the actual running of the initiative. UNICEF and the UN Theme Group on HIV & AIDS could decisively support this process through advocacy.

Priority 2 – (Re)sharpen Take Control’s profile
It needs to become clear again what Take Control is and what it does. It needs to be considered what the initiative realistically can and should do. Core activities need to be clearly defined.

To meet partner expectations and in the light of past focus, it should probably be an advisory, coordinating and to a certain extent supervisory body for HIV communication. Take Control would thus be responsible for

- the development of a national communication strategy and
- the initiation and supervision of a small set of core activities on national level. These would - as in the past – mainly include the organisation of key events such as World AIDS Day and, of course, the national HIV & AIDS media campaign for the general public.

Beyond that, Take Control would serve as a focal point through which partners with targeted communication components can coordinate and link up with the national campaign.
Priority 3 - Renew commitment of partners
True commitment to Take Control has been eroded due to confusion about campaign goals and partners’ roles. Especially media partners have withdrawn from the campaign. Another source of frustration is the recurrent discussion about the core messages of the campaign as formulated in the ABC approach. After sharpening its profile and with stronger backing, the initiative should therefore try to reinvigorate former and existing partnerships.

One step could be to formulate in a participatory process the common ground that Take Control partners are working on. The main challenge would be to create a platform on which all organisations embrace a version of the ABC that successfully integrates abstinence, partner reduction and condom use approaches. The recently held discussion forum with FBO’s on the ABC is a move into that direction.

At the same time, the commitment key media partners needs to be regained and formalised. To do so, Take Control would have to formulate clearly what media organisations’ role in the campaign is and also would have to be willing to create new mechanisms of cooperation that take media partners’ culture and needs into account (for instance through a media advocacy officer). For instance, one could consider organising private media partners in a joint initiative (“Media for Take Control”), through which private media support could become a common effort. Through such an initiative, the scope of support could be harmonised (e.g. equal discounts on booking), media involvement in the development of the campaign’s media components be strengthened and public acknowledgement be increased.

Priority 4 - Develop clear and realistic strategies and annual work plans
The lack of direction of the Take Control campaign has not only led to most activities having little cohesion but at the same time has confused partners and hindered meaningful coordination. Take Control therefore needs to develop a clear overall long term communication strategy and break it down in focused and realistic annual, tactical work plans.

The strategy formulation process offers great potential to strengthen legitimacy and ownership of the campaign. This could be tapped through a highly consultative strategy development process where main long-term strategic goals are agreed. This process would be repeated annually to formulate the focus areas of Take Control communication activities for the year in line with the overall strategy. As focus is of utmost importance to come up with realistic and effective work plans, this process would need intense facilitation.

All jointly developed strategy proposals could then be presented to a leading national decision-making body such as NAEC for input and ultimate approval. This - and the consultative process - would result in more legitimacy and ownership of all Take Control activities.

Priority 5 - Broaden funding base
Take Control has depended - and still does so today - strongly on UNICEF (and to a lesser extent UNFPA) as a funding partner. This has not only had detrimental effects
on ownership but also limited the campaign to target groups outside the adolescent and young people constituencies of these UN agencies. Broader funding will secure more universal acceptance and flexibility in content.

A clearer profile and improved legitimacy and partner support will also make Take Control more attractive to other donors. While funds disbursed through the Global Fund might ease the situation for a while, Take Control should continue to seek more funding as its organisational capacity improves. The 2003 World AIDS Day team has proven through its successful fundraising drive that Take Control already today has potential to attract funds when it presents itself with a clear sense of direction and capacity. Also, Government needs to be lobbied to increase support to HIV & AIDS communication to ensure sustainability.

Priority 6 – Improve communication with audiences and regions
Take Control has thus far not made enough effort to hear its target audiences out. There is a need to make better use of links to regional partners and to involve them in the development of locally appropriate materials. Also, the distribution to the regions needs further strengthening. Similarly, cooperation with audiences such as young people and a stronger involvement of PLWHA will be necessary to make the campaign messages more relevant.

Priority 7 - Improve communication with partners
The lack of information about Take Control, its activities and goals, among partners is startling. This is to some extent the result from the initiative’s lack of strategy and might also reflect a decline in interest and commitment. However, it appears that the way Take Control communicates with its partners also plays a role and that the campaign needs to strive to provide different partners with clear and concise information filtered according to relevance.

Priority 8 – Improve pre-testing, monitoring and evaluation
All campaign messages and activities need to go through and improved process of critical assessment. Pre-testing of messages and materials as well as field monitoring and regular evaluation need to become the norm to continuously improve the campaign.

All tools used so far - subcommittees and working groups, shared minutes, e-mail notification - are in principle good. Yet, the way they have been used needs to be revisited. Overall, communication with partners needs to go beyond the notification culture common to public administrations. Communication needs to be proactive and, wherever possible, personal. All meetings and working groups will need management. This means follow up on responsibilities, continuous communication with members and processing of information. Regular communication tools such as shared minutes and e-mails need to be checked for relevance, user-friendliness and clarity.

This list of priorities and proposed actions naturally represents what ideally would have to be done to tackle all the challenges Take Control is facing in meeting the expectations of its stakeholders and partners. Much of the proposed action obviously
requires immensely increased management and coordination work. Such management and coordination of *Take Control* would have to be taken on by MIB’s Directorate PM. The Directorate has, however, currently limited resources at its disposal. The following section, Part II of this paper, investigates in greater detail what the current capacities are. In Part III, it will then be looked at how the Directorate can realistically respond to increased campaign management needs with the resources that will be available through its regular structure, the Global Fund and support from partners.
Part II:
The Coordinator
Campaign management capacities at MIB
5. The Coordinator
An assessment of campaign management capacities at the Directorate Print Media

Through its Division Ad Hoc Publications and Exhibitions, MIB’s Directorate of Print Media has taken the lead in coordinating the Take Control campaign. The Ministry’s lead role in HIV & AIDS related communication has also been reaffirmed recently in MTP III and is reflected by the disbursement of funds through the Global Fund to the Ministry for future HIV & AIDS communication work.

While the Directorate continues to be assisted by UNICEF in handling the campaign (especially regarding its mass media component), the goal is for MIB to ultimately take over the entire management.

This second part examines what capacities the Directorate currently has - and will have through the support from the Global Fund - to manage the campaign more effectively and eventually take on more tasks. To do so, the consultant interviewed all staff involved in campaign management and support services within the Directorate, and selected staff as well as the Accounting Officer at Head Offices. Four of the ten regional representatives were also interviewed (complete listing of interviews conducted in the annex). To facilitate the talks and to get more insight into daily work processes and environment, the consultant was working within the Directorate for the project period of three months.

The exercise focused on the Directorate PM and, more specifically, on the section that is handling campaigns. While the Directorate AVM has traditionally also supported Take Control (specifically with production work rather than management) the consultant had no mandate to examine capacities within Audiovisual. However, some valuable input was given through the kind cooperation of the Director AVM.

Loosely guided by DAI’s capacity assessment indicators, the research looked at the institutional set-up, physical, financial and human resources and at management and leadership issues.

Ultimately, the goal was to find out about campaign management and production capacities within the Directorate as well as to identify capacity gaps. The results of this assessment were then used for Part III to contrast capacities with the campaign management needs identified earlier and to start of a process of jointly developing ideas how the handling of Take Control (and campaigns in general) can realistically be improved.

5.1 Institutional Framework
MIB mission & structure

This section examines in how far the management of Take Control is in line with MIB’s mission and whether the responsible Directorate’s structure is apt to take on campaign coordination tasks.
**Mission**

The MIB has been established as the communication link between Government and the people. Its declared goal is to

"facilitate the free flow of information in order to empower the people of the Republic of Namibia with knowledge through effective communication to contribute to nationhood and development."¹

As such, the Ministry is tasked to develop and disseminate information on Government policies as well as on development and civic issues (for instance on voters’ education). Currently, following campaigns are to be run by MIB: voters’ education campaign, public service charter campaign, the campaign against violence against women and children and, finally, the Population IEC and *Take Control* campaigns. Furthermore, the Directorate is tasked to inform the public on Government policies.

*Take Control* is not only anchored at MIB through MTP III but also through the requirements of the National Population Policy², which assigns communication for family planning and reproductive health to the Ministry. The implementation of the *Take Control* media campaign can thus be considered to be in line with MIB’s mission. National policy documents also firmly put the campaign in MIB’s field responsibility. MIB’s Permanent Secretary acknowledged this and pointed out that the advocacy role of the Ministry as well as its experience with information work in the regions made MIB the best choice to take on HIV & AIDS communication.

It should be noted again, however, that this has not always been as clear as it appears now: MTP II was still ambiguous about who was to lead HIV & AIDS communication in assigning a key role to MIB but envisaging leadership by MOHSS. This might still to some extent affect views of MIB’s role in HIV & AIDS communication. Interviews suggest that there are still many people that assume that HIV & AIDS communication would be an issue to be taken up by Health

**Structure**

The Directorate Print Media and Regional Offices and to a lesser extent the Directorate Audiovisual Media are the two directorates of the MIB dealing with information campaigns. The Directorate PM is again divided into various subdivisions: Publications, Maintenance, Support Services and Regional Information Offices. Two sections of the Directorate are tasked with the handling most of the campaign work: The section Periodicals and Exhibitions (Take Control) and the section Information, Education and Communication Advocacy which replaced the former research section to manage the Population IEC Project. The section *Regular Publications* publishes the magazine Namibia Review.

¹ According to a definition used in internal documentation.
² NPC (1997): "National Population Policy for Sustainable Human Development": Windhoek
INSERT PROPOSED STRUCTURE
As the section titles already indicate, the old structure of the Directorate PM might not have been designed to implement a larger number of media campaigns at all. In any case, the staffing is somewhat meagre with regard to the tasks: The structure makes provision for merely tow media officers supported by a designer and photographer in the *Periodicals and Exhibitions* section. Campaign management was, however, strengthened with the formation of the *IEC Advocacy* section that is to employ a single coordinating Chief Information Officer and a supporting Information Officer. A direct link with the 10 ministries regional offices exists in this structure only through one Regional Support Officer, whose task is, however, mainly to provide operational support. The structure makes no reference to stock, financial and supply services. This might be a weakness given the substantial amounts of outside funds channelled through the directorate and the fact that campaigns usually involve large supply components. In fact, the 2003 audit report for the *Population IEC Project* noted that weaknesses in the handling of money affect control of funds and smooth project operations. As a result, UNFPA advised to employ a financial assistant and signalled support if the project decided that this was needed.

In the light of the many commitments of the Directorate PM the need to develop a campaign planning unit was recognised by management. In May 2003, an internal memorandum presents the draft of a new structure that reshuffles approved positions to strengthen campaign coordination at national level. To achieve this, the plan is mainly moving vacant regional posts to headquarters to form a section *Campaigns & Exhibitions* that unites all campaign work. In fact, the management of *Take Control* and *Population IEC* has already been unified in de facto campaign work.

The proposal is putting great emphasis on an increased link with Regional Offices, reserving 4 of 9 Chief Information/Information Officers entirely and one further officer partly to regional coordination duties. This surly is justified as a response to the decentralisation process and also makes sense in the light of an increased need to strengthen campaigns on regional and sub-regional levels.

Of the two media/information officers in the joint secretariat for all campaigns (policy and development as well as *Population IEC/Take Control*) respectively one is assigned to the two campaigns sections. Given the requirements of running campaigns, it should however be considered whether they should not rather take on much needed tasks around media liaison and media planning on one hand and event coordination and planning on the other. These fields – that have emerged as “missing links” within the management of the *Take Control* campaign – are not considered in the structure at all. Neither the old nor the new structure make reference to the linkages with the Section *Regular Publications* – where under the management of the *Namibia Review* all expertise in journalistic writing and graphic design is to be concentrated. All the Ministry’s capacities in the field of audiovisual production are currently found outside the Directorate with the Directorate AVM.

Looking at the currently approved structure, the need for a new structure that reflects the needs of increased campaign work and stronger links with the regions can only be confirmed. Management is on the right track with its plans to restructure. It is recommended, however, to not neglect tasks around media advocacy and mass media production as well as event coordination in the new structure and to formalise links between the sections *Regular Publications* and *Campaigns*. 
5.2 Resources

Physical, financial and human resources

To successfully run any campaign, the Directorate PM needs to be adequately resourced with facilities, communication and transport equipment, campaign funds and human resources. This section investigates all of these areas to determine whether significant gaps exist that hinder the efficient implementation of campaigns.

5.2.1 Facilities, transport and communications resources

Facilities

Physical facilities at the Directorate’s headquarter are sufficient to give ample space to the current team and would also be sufficient to accommodate an extended team as foreseen in the proposed structure. The Directorate would, however, have difficulties in taking over IEC material stocks currently kept in the UNICEF/NYC warehouse.

In addition, MIB is present all across Namibia with a total of 10 regional offices. Regional offices are located in Katima Mulilo, Gobabis, Oshakati, Swakopmund, Mariental, Keetmanshoop, Opuwo, Rundu, Otjiwarongo and Tsumeb. Offices in Ohangwena and Omusati could, however, not be opened as planned due to the lack of funds. The Khomas region also does not have a Regional Office as it is to be served from headquarters. The consultant has not visited regional offices but in interviews with selected regional staff, there were no complaints about the facilities voiced by the regional representatives interviewed.

Communications

Despite being an information provider, the Directorate’s communications equipment is not always satisfactory.

Computer equipment: At headquarters, all of the campaign key staff and the graphic designer at Publications have computers that meet their needs. Clerical staff as well as the campaign secretariat had, however, during the period of observation no computer and some of the computers in use in other offices were very old. Newer computers have been mainly donor financed. One of the computers purchased through UNICEF was delivered without proof of purchase, which made it difficult to take advantage of guarantee repair services when the screen broke down. Supplying the Ministry with guarantee forms and invoices needs to be considered when providing equipment in the future.

An evaluation of the internal IT unit revealed in 2003 that three offices in the regions are without working computers and two rely on refurbished models. Four offices have newer PC’s and the Erongo office is using equipment provided by the Regional Council after the breakdown of their old Apple computer.

The Directorate expects to provide computers to all staff in Windhoek through the Global Fund. However, computer purchases for the regions are not covered by the agreement and will continue to constitute a constraint to the work of Rio’s and to integrating all regional offices into a network (see below: Network services).
Maintenance of computers and electronic devices also appear to be a problem. The budget 2003/2004 only makes provision for N$ 10,000 to be spent on computer repairs and maintenance and an additional N$ 9,000 for service of photocopiers and fax machines. However, UNFPA is also providing funds for maintenance CHECK. This budget is according to staff within the Directorate not always sufficient to cover all needed repairs as was demonstrated in 2003 when the repair and upgrading of the graphics computer consumed virtually the whole budget. The MIB IT officer noted, however, that the Directorate was often acting too independently in this regard. As the Directorate had monies to pay for outside repairs, it would often bypass the IT unit that might be able to fix minor repairs or to at least identify problems to avoid overcharging by service providers. While this appears to be a result of the MFAIB times - when the IT unit was mainly busy with servicing the large number of users in Foreign Affairs.

Currently, however, the process of repairing electronic devices is sluggish and a frequent source of complaint for many regional offices. All defective office machinery has to be sent to headquarters’ supply section for repairs or replacement. This often leaves Regional Information Officers (RIO) for weeks without crucial work tools. The Directorate might want to explore possibilities to have minor repairs done at regional level to speed up repair processes and ease the workload of its supply section. Also, it was urged to step up consultation with the IT unit to better assess needed repairs. This could be done by determining a fixed day – for instance every second week – that the IT officer spends in the Directorate to support the supply clerk and tend to minor problems.

As the Directorate expects to remedy the lack of computers through the Global Fund, it is recommended not to neglect funding and steps for improved maintenance in the process.

Network services: None of the computers are linked to a local area network or with the Government’s intranet even though cabling has already been finalised. However, the process of linking the Directorate to the Government network has been initiated and is expected to be finalised shortly. This would also allow all linked staff to access the Internet. Currently, there is only one computer in the Directorate linked through the Government to the net. The Director and the development worker are accessing the web through a private and a DED-sponsored account.

None of the regional offices is connected through MIB, but it is a priority at IT to bring them online. Next to the necessary computers, modems and accounts with a private ISP still need to be financed. Bringing the RIO’s online could greatly facilitate communication with headquarters and among regional offices and Offices should therefore be a priority. As telephone abuse is however, commonly experienced in the Ministry, control mechanisms and/or restrictions need to be applied. For the time being, it might be wise to aim at an “e-mail only” solution.

The design unit under Regular Publications is fully operational with two graphic machines in good working order (even though the 1997 PC used by the graphic artist needed major repairs recently). There is also an operational colour laser printer and other necessary peripheral devices.
Outside the directorate, AVM boasts a digital editing suite and TV grade recording equipment. Recently, 13 digital cameras have been required for the regional offices and there are plans to create more regional editing facilities next to the existing one in Oshakati. The consultant did not have a mandate to look at the resources of the Directorate AVM.

Transport

As Namibia is a vast country with a spread out population, transport is a common restriction for many projects. Specifically, Regional AIDS Coordinators have suffered for many years from a lack of mobility in the regions. In comparison, MIB and its Regional Offices are fairly well equipped. At headquarters, there are five vehicles at the disposal of the Directorate: A 4x4 and a 16-seater bus have been sponsored by UNFPA. The 4x4 is mainly used for purposes related to Take Control; the bus is only used for workshops and larger events. In addition, there are three Government sedans (for Namibia Review, Support Services and the campaign related sections).

In the regions, all offices have access to at least one vehicle (in total, 11 are operational). However, at least three are old 1989 model vehicles taken over from UNTAG after independence. A number of others (Opuwo, Keetmanshoop) reportedly give a lot of mechanical problems and need regular workshop time after field trips.

An updating of the fleet is thus imminent and a modest extension, specifically with regard of AV vans and at headquarters makes sense. Both issues are to be addressed through the Global Fund which will provide funds for the acquisition of four AV Vans, four 4x4 vehicles to replace old cars at regional level and four sedans to cover rising transport needs that would result from a closer support of regional offices by headquarters. If these funds should not become available, however, the Directorate and regional offices are likely to soon face escalating transport problems.

5.2.2 Financial Resources

To have any impact, a national campaign needs significant financial resources to develop, test and run materials and/or to prepare and implement corresponding events. This section attempts to quantify how much money has been available throughout the year 2003, whether these funds have been sufficient and what funding Take Control can expect in the near future. The assessment has concentrated on the core activities of the campaign only: the production and dissemination of IEC materials, the national mass media campaign and the activities around World AIDS Day. More funds are usually available for workshops, research and trainings.

Take Control has been and still is mainly funded by UNICEF and, to a lesser extent, UNFPA. Specifically regarding the production and placement of national media campaign materials UNICEF has been the only donor through its Adolescent HIV Prevention Programme (AHPP).
Production and dissemination of IEC materials

**Production:** The *Take Control* media campaign has traditionally focused on producing IEC materials for the use by Government and NGO information workers in the field. Independently from more focused mass media campaign materials, the IEC materials are to provide a wide variety of background information on key topics related to HIV & AIDS.

In 2003, *Take Control* has updated and expanded its entire background information package. An updated general information *Young Person’s Guide to Safer Sex* and six focused *How to Guides* on specific topics were produced. *Take Control* plans to use this information package throughout 2004 and 2005.

The campaign also has its own regular information and educational publications: *Take Control Bulletins*, provide in-depth information on current issues around HIV & AIDS to educators and the general public. *Open Talk* is a youth geared educational newspaper supplement published through the NYC with contents focusing on reproductive health.

In 2003, a total of 101,422 US$ (around 652,520 N$) was spent on the production of the new IEC package and the regular publications. While a revamping and updating of IEC materials will not be necessary on an annual basis, the largest part of the overall spending was incurred by printing (59,104 US$ for the information package alone). Regular productions also mainly incur printing costs as design and development is done by MIB and NYC staff.

UNICEF covers virtually all cost of IEC material development and printing. Interestingly, none of the UNFPA funds earmarked for “publication” (5,000 US$ in 2003, 16,750 US$ for 2004) had been used for either IEC or media campaign materials. The Director attributed this to a lack of planning and confusion what these funds were intended for. Government has allocated a mere 200,000 N$ for printing, which is almost entirely consumed by *Namibia Review*.

**Dissemination:** The bulk of *Take Control* IEC material distribution is handled by UNICEF in cooperation with NYC. The annual expenditure on the warehouse, remuneration for volunteers and shipping is 85,881 N$ (12,549 US$) and entirely footed by UNICEF.

The Directorate PM also mails out IEC materials (mainly bulletins) occasionally and had an adequate overall shipping budget of 42,000 N$ in 2003/2004 (for comparison: UNICEF spent a total of 19,504 N$ to send out *Take Control* materials in 2003).

**Future outlook:** While annual material development cost will – spread over the years – probably be less, costs for re-printing needs to be considered. There might, however, be additions to the *How to Guides* series, if the need arises. Also, *Take Control* will need to provide material targeting groups other than youth and improve on pretesting. Savings on new material development will also probably be compensated for by the cost for the adaptation of materials into local languages. On the other hand, there has been overlap between the bulletins and IEC material. Better coordination will allow for more efficient use of resources. Production costs for the regular publications can be expected to remain stable.

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3 Plus an additional 10,000 N$ for „excess weight“.  

In this light, it can be expected that similar funds as expended in 2003 – if not more - will be needed in the future to provide comprehensive information materials.

UNICEF has committed itself to cover much of the reprinting/added material development cost and Global Fund monies are expected to be available to create materials for other target groups: 45,000 US$ are to be spent on IEC for vulnerable target groups, 30,000 US$ for IEC on substance abuse and gender, close to 25,000 US$ for regionalised videos during the first year. A total of 50,000 US$ is earmarked for IEC production in the second year. If disbursed, this will leave the IEC component of the campaign well resourced in the immanent future.

However, the low contribution of Government funds might pose a problem in terms of sustainability of Take Control and already limit the implementation of other campaigns that do not enjoy similar outside funding.

Mass media campaign

The production and dissemination of IEC materials is complemented by mass media communication activities. These concentrate usually on two “campaign intensifications” annually that last for about 4 to 6 weeks. Intensifications can introduce, highlight and reinforce more focused and simple messages and advertisements are run in all major print and electronic media. Costs are thus mainly incurred by development, production and placement of mass media advertising materials. Regarding placement, the campaign benefits from the support of public broadcaster NBC but still has to cover expenses for running ads in newspapers, popular private radio stations and for the use of outdoor advertising.

Production & placement: In 2003, Take Control also launched new mass media campaign materials. Production for both the mass media and information materials were done by advertising agency DV8. UNICEF expended about 647,951 N$ (92,455 US$) for the development, production and running of campaign materials during three intensifications. This amount had allowed for the production of print advertisements, TV spots, radio spots and support material (posters, postcards), but the funding did not suffice for the campaign to gain critical mass in the commercial media. This was partially due to a split up of print campaign funds (a total of 200,000 N$) in three intensifications with different materials. At the same time, NBC appeared to provide less airtime than usual and little funds were set aside to buy private radio airtime (merely 3,220 N$) adding to the weak penetration of audiences. Also, a planned adaptation of materials in two languages as well as thorough testing of print materials did not take place.

Future outlook: Production costs (development of electronic and print materials totalled about N$ 190,000) were rated as high by a UNICEF production consultant. Yet, it is likely that an amount of N$ 600,000 to 700,000 will be necessary to run the media campaign with sufficient media power, language adaptations, quality and variety. It appears, however, that material development and adaptations will become more cost effective with better strategic planning, closer production supervision⁴, the inclusion of low cost formats (such as Speak

⁴ The production consultant had noted that hidden charges, the use of expensive papers and charges for services not rendered were sources of increased cost. See: Madan (2003)
### Overview of Take Control Campaign Funds

*(media campaign, information materials and World AIDS Day only)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Development</th>
<th>2003 Source</th>
<th>Actual Funds</th>
<th>2004 Source</th>
<th>Actual Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media Campaign</td>
<td></td>
<td>N$</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>19,433</td>
<td>2804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>55,645</td>
<td>8058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>73,323</td>
<td>11,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32,643</td>
<td>4739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booking Costs (two runs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>426</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private radio (November only)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>118,563</td>
<td>160,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV (NBC only)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-testing</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>75,762</td>
<td>99,45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language adaptations (two)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>80,646</td>
<td>110,46</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Printing campaign support</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>30,319</td>
<td>44,06</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Posters (24000)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>25,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Postcards (100000)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>125,857</td>
<td>182,93</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>T-Shirts (5366)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>192,534</td>
<td>276,67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language adaptations (two)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>131,698</td>
<td>183,87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Media Campaign</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>647,591</td>
<td>924,55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information component</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>83,223</td>
<td>128,70</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC Material Development</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>44,8817</td>
<td>67,422</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-testing</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>not done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC Material Printing</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>120,480</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Take Control Bulletin</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>260,1095</td>
<td>400,277</td>
<td>UNFPA/UNICEF/GF 224,570*</td>
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<td>Total IEC</td>
<td>UNFPA/UNICEF/GF</td>
<td>652,520</td>
<td>101,422</td>
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<td>Other materials</td>
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<td>276,67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>131,698</td>
<td>183,87</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Other</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>460,54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total campaign &amp; IEC materials</td>
<td>UNFPA/UNICEF/GF</td>
<td>260,1095</td>
<td>400,277</td>
<td>224,570*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Talk</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>528,217</td>
<td>704,29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open Talk Outreach</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>111,462</td>
<td>148,60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Open Talk</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>539,682</td>
<td>719,15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>260,1095</td>
<td>400,277</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>41,400</td>
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<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>34,79</td>
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<td>Shipping Cost UNICEF</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>195,04</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping Cost GRN</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. (Packing Materials)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Distribution</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>85,881</td>
<td>125,49</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>World AIDS Day</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>973,33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events produced by OY</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to regions</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>173,33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World AIDS Day</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>973,33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Core Activities</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>131,581</td>
<td>763,87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Funds expected and earmarked by UNICEF, UNFPA, Global Fund for campaign and IEC materials development, testing, printing and placement. UNICEF plans to spend another 64,000 US$ on the development and production of educational TV and radio shows.
Outs) and – to a limited extent – the tapping of production resources at MIB. The goal should be to reach an improved production/dissemination cost ratio.

UNICEF plans to spend less on the production of materials in 2004 (15,000 US$/ about 97,500 N$ earmarked in PPA) but will provide additional funds for educational TV and radio programmes. However, for newspaper placement, only half the amount is scheduled (also 15,000 US$), further neglecting needed media power in general and radio airtime in particular. Improved cooperation with NBC might, however, compensate for this. Provisions are made, on the other hand, to reprint campaign support materials including T-shirts that traditionally consume most of this budget (a solid 18,000 US$ in 2003). Both, UNICEF and UNFPA plan to provide funds for pretesting.

Overall, funding to continue the running of the mass media campaign is available, but the cost of material development will have to be scaled down significantly. It should also be considered to shift funds in a way to strengthen placement, especially on radio and outdoor ad, both of which have a wider and more universal reach. Again, the almost complete dependence on UN funds is of concern and limits the capacity to address other target groups than youth through the mass media campaign, unless Global Fund monies can be channelled into this component. Technically, there is some insecurity about how UNFPA funds are to be used since the Deputy Director that has led the project has resigned. With both UN project funds united channelled through the Director’s office under the Population IEC project, UNICEF and UNFPA should consider to step up joint planning for the use of these monies.

World AIDS Day

Unlike the media campaign, the coordination of World AIDS Day has been mainly done through the Directorate PM and the Take Control Task Force. The 2003 WAD organising committee - spearheaded by Ombetja Yehinga - has been quite successful in securing funding from a large variety of sources: UN agencies and bilateral donors supported the drive as well as MIB through its Population IEC monies. A total of 600,000 N$ was eventually raised to finance an event tour through the regions. Another 130,000 N$ of Government and UNFPA funds were given directly to the regions. The coordinator felt that this was the minimum amount necessary to bring WAD events to the regions. While the fundraising success illustrates the potential of Take Control to attract funds from a wider source of donors, these monies cannot be taken for granted and need the full effort and commitment of a competent organising team.

Overall assessment

Overall, the campaign is currently fairly well funded with a total of about 5,3 Million N$ (plus airtime of NBC and community radio stations) available in 2003 for its core activities. There are further funds available for training, research and documentation, which were not included in this overview. However, to achieve a larger presence in the media, to get to more target groups beyond the youth and to increase the reach to regional levels, some more monies will probably be needed. At the same time, UNICEF will make less funds available for mass media and IEC material development, and printing.
This might be remedied to a certain degree with funds from the Global Fund, through smart partnerships with the private media and through careful planning and integration of all campaign activities. Also, it can be expected that development costs were exceptionally high in 2003 with a complete relaunch of both mass media and IEC campaign materials.

With regard to ownership as well as to the longer-term sustainability of campaign funding, it is of concern that the campaign is to the largest part funded by external donor money. MIB has earmarked no funds for placement, hardly any funds for IEC material printing and a mere N$ 300,000 under the wider Population IEC project for HIV & AIDS related campaign activities. While funding for 2004 and 2005 appears quite secure, fundraising – within and outside Government structures - might become important for *Take Control* in the medium term and already is an issue for other campaigns run by the Directorate.

### 5.2.1 Human Resources

Staff had surfaced from early on as one of the key capacity issues in the Directorate PM and the situation is indeed serious: Overall, there are 110 posts in the approved structure of the Directorate, 27 at Windhoek head offices and 83 at regional offices. 53 of these posts are currently budgeted but only 44 actually filled. One journalist is working on a freelance/intern basis for *Namibia Review* and one development worker supports the team on a half post. Budgeted vacancies are: 1 *Deputy Director*, 4 *Information Officers*, 2 *Media Officers* (*Namibia Review*) and 2 *Clerical Assistants*. However, in the light of a very recent budget freeze it is unlikely that all of these vacancies will actually be filled. The *Director* expects to at best be able to hire a *Deputy Director*, two *Information* and a *Media Officer* and a *Personal Assistant*.

While - as noted above - the approved structure already makes limited provision for staff needed to run a number of national campaigns, this situation is aggravated by the reality of severe understaffing. Human resources have thus been pooled to handle the extensive work requirements of the *Take Control* campaign. Currently, the *Director* herself, a newly appointed *Information Officer*, the development worker and the only *Chief Information Officer* try to run all campaigns.

Other sections in the Directorate PM are equally depleted: *Support Services* operated for much of 2003 with only one *Clerk* responsible for stock and supplies until a new *Control Information Officer* was eventually hired to coordinate support to the regional offices. Equally *Namibia Review*’s editor can only rely on the services of a single freelance/intern writer and a graphic designer. While all ten regional offices are staffed, there are only two (Swakopmund & Rundu) that actually employ two *Information Officers* as is envisaged by the approved structure.

Overall, the low numbers of middle management staff (on the level of *Chief* and *Control Information Officer*) that would link lower level posts with management at the Directorate level are of concern.
Staff qualifications

Inadequacies do not only exist in the level of staffing but also with regard to staff qualifications. It is striking that a substantial part of the staff members interviewed did not have specific training for the jobs they were actually doing. For instance, of the six Information/Chief Information Officers that were handling much of the campaign matters at regional and national level, four did not have any specific communication related background and two came from journalism. This in fact, reflects the situation in the whole Directorate: While there is some staff with journalistic background, there is not a single employee that has a thorough background specifically relevant to the management of campaigns (such as marketing communication, social marketing or advertising). Some training has apparently taken place through the Population IEC project at regional and national level. Notably, the project coordinator had attended a four months training course on IEC in Ghana. Most of the Ministry’s information workers, however, have acquired skills on the job. As there is hardly senior staff that could transfer skills in the field, they were most of the time left to their own devices while doing so. This resulted in slower learning processes and in some insecurity as to what level of expertise actually has been reached. On the clerical level, there was still a need for more extensive computer training. Trainings have been rare and mostly over short periods and MIB has so far not supported staff in pursuing further studies.

Many staff members have expressed a need for further qualification. This has not only been reflected by the strong demand for more training and study opportunities. Lack of skills was also one of the six key issues identified during a 2002 strategic planning workshop with regional staff. While the interviewed staff has not really seen any progress in this field yet, it is encouraging that MIB is now in the process of creating ways to financially support staff with their studies, as is already common practice in many other ministries.

Attracting qualified staff

One of the causes of the lack of trained staff in the Directorate is a problem to attract and keep such staff. This also aggravates understaffing as it has repeatedly happened that vacant positions could not be filled.

Obviously, the Ministry has to compete with all other Namibian employers for a limited pool of skilled personnel. However, MIB’s salary scales are even by Government standards low: For instance, regional representatives in other line ministries were likely to receive more money than RIO’s who were

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Salary levels comparison - Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional representatives</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIB: Information Officer (2B/2)</td>
<td>51,433 N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 yr B Degree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA: Agricultural Ext. Officer (2C/2)</td>
<td>66,753 N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 yr B or Bhon Degree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOHSS: Health Programme Admin. (SP2)</td>
<td>76,437 N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 yr B Degree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management positions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIB: Control Information Officer (3A/1)</td>
<td>90,741 N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOHSS: Chief Health Programmes (3B/1)</td>
<td>110,922 N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector: Marketing Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIB: Information/Media Officer (2B/2)</td>
<td>51,433 N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector: PR Officer</td>
<td>70,800 N$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All GRN salaries starting salaries. Marketing Manager benefits usually compare to GRN benefits. On Information Officer level, GRN benefits are usually better (housing).

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5 Draft report on the MIB Strategic Planning Workshop, Outjo, May 2002
employed at *Information Officer* level. During the interviews it was also pointed out that media and communication workers would be hesitant to work within little flexible Government structures where their work was often not appreciated and potential for growth was limited. In favour of employment with the Government work the generous housing benefits and, to some extent, job security. Yet, at higher level, such benefits are often also offered in the private sector as the 2002 Salary Survey reveals.

**Staff morale & staff retention**

Many of the issues that hamper the attraction of trained staff also affect the job satisfaction and ultimately staff retention. The 2002 workshop identified low staff motivation as a serious problem within the Directorate PM. Apart from remuneration issues, a lack of acknowledgement and purpose and limited career opportunities appear to be at the core of staff complaints.

**Salaries:** Low salaries are not only a problem in attracting qualified staff but also affect staff satisfaction and retention. There is a high turnover of staff within the Directorate as especially journalists leave MIB for better-paid positions. Low salaries have also contributed to the depletion of administrative staff during the merger with Foreign Affairs.

**Acknowledgement, purpose and direction:** Regional, lower management and service staff voiced that they often felt superiors did not acknowledge their work. While there is a general willingness to take on extra work and to sometimes work under difficult circumstances, this willingness is diminished by a feeling that extra effort is not taken note of and not appreciated.

At national level this is compounded by many staff having no sense of purpose or direction as they have to perform duties that do not necessarily correspond with their job descriptions. Within the Directorate there often is no clear definition of who is responsible for what. Also, there is little understanding in how far many activities contribute to the larger goals of MIB. However, it was also observed that all interviewed regional staff claimed not to know about the purpose of the latest *Take Control* campaign materials while they all had received detailed background information with the last material shipment. Also, management pointed out that Regional Officer are present at annual reviews and are briefed about backgrounds and strategies.

These effects seem again to be at least to some extent reflections of the lack of staff in general: the absence of middle management staff that could supervise and guide service and regional staff in particular obviously results in lack of acknowledgement and too little communication about what is done why. The suspension of performance evaluation systems in 1996 might also contribute to the feeling that extra effort is not rewarded.

**Career & growth opportunities:** Limited opportunities to develop and advance professionally also negatively affect staff morale. As has been pointed out above, training is

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6 The approved structure foresees Chief Information Officer positions (SP2/2 level) in all regions, but these have not been filled since independence. In the meantime, the information officers have been performing all tasks related to regional representation.

7 Jobs Unlimited (2003)
rare and the lack of senior second level managers in many positions also does not allow for an effective transfer of skills. As a consequence, many staff experience their work with MIB as a period of professional stagnation.

This is compounded by the limited opportunities to progress within the structure: It is not uncommon that staff members have not been promoted in rank over periods of up to 10 years. This has not only monetary implications but also makes affected staff members question their own abilities and contributes to a negative attitude towards work. While in the face of a highly under budgeted and understaffed structure there simply often are no positions that staff could be promoted to, there is, however, also a feeling that once positions become available employment of outside candidates is favoured over developing internal team members.

One staff member observed that as a result of the low staff morale there is an extreme reluctance within the Directorate’s team to take initiative and responsibility for even the smallest tasks. Despite the high levels of frustration, it must, however, also be noted that many staff members expressed clearly that they actually like their jobs information workers. Most are simply hoping for work conditions to improve.

Staff attitudes towards Take Control

The running of the Take Control media campaign is one of the major tasks within the Directorate. As such, most staff members in the sections dealing with campaigns and in the regions as well as members of Namibia Review's team have in some way or the other been involved in campaign work. Yet, attitudes towards Take Control differ greatly at national and at regional levels:

The regional representatives interviewed were likely to display a positive attitude towards the campaign. Most of them felt that HIV & AIDS communication was, in fact, a priority area or even a “national call”. They felt that Take Control was taking up the greater share of their time, the situation on the ground justified this.

Such attitudes could virtually not be observed at headquarters. Here, staff were much more likely to think that the role of Take Control was too prominent within the Directorate and that it commanded too many resources and time at the expense of other activities. It was also felt, that the Director’s attention was almost exclusively directed towards Take Control. Staff not directly working with campaigns appeared reluctant to render any assistance to Take Control related activities.

It was pointed out that it would help if the team was better informed why Take Control was at MIB, what the Ministry’s obligations under the MTP were and what the campaign tried to achieve. One staff member also took the view that, in fact, Take Control was not taking up too much space within MIB, but that the challenge, was to ensure that all other campaigns would receive similar resources. Others pondered an idea that had already been brought up by some Take Control partners – whether it would not be better to create a unit of its own that would only deal with the campaign to free “regular” resources for other duties.
5.3 Management & Leadership Issues

In the course of this exercise, general management issues, such as management styles and management mechanisms were to be examined. During staff interviews, it also surfaced that there were also issues related to the general leadership of MIB that affect the work in the Directorate in general and the handling of Take Control in particular. All these issues are discussed in this section.

General management constraints

The key problem during the assessment of management - and in fact the main restraint for a successful management of the Directorate itself - is once again the lack of staff. The significant gaps on the middle management level results in much of the campaign planning, operational and supervisory work being taken care of by the Director. Thus, too many tasks and responsibilities remain at the upper management level with the Director not being able to handle all of them. At the same time, lower rank staff often goes idle or operate in a vacuum (specifically regional staff).

The depleted staff structure and the resulting excessive workload for the few middle and upper management staff make it difficult to take on many management issues such as supervision, staff motivation or delegation. Some of these issues are nevertheless discussed below but should be seen in this context.

Management mechanisms

At the Directorate’s national offices, weekly campaign team meetings had been introduced in 2003. These were to share information on current projects and to identify and to follow-up on work that needed to be done. Even though staff commented favourably on these meetings, they have more or less petered out and have been replaced more or less effectively by ad hoc meetings. The consultant observed, however, that despite there are rather few staff, it is at times difficult to convene meetings due to substantial out of office time in the Directorate (see below). Management meetings involving the heads of the Directorates and MIB top management take place on a weekly basis. It was reported, however, that it was not uncommon that they would be cancelled.

Communication with the regions is sporadic at best: While regions are supposed to submit monthly work proposals and reports, they rarely receive feedback. Regional Officers also hoped for more regular meetings with their colleagues and headquarters staff to facilitate the exchange of experiences and information.

The lack of feedback on regional reports is a reflection of missing supervisory staff. However, indications are that controls for the disbursement of funds - for instance for the implementation of monthly regional work plans - are at the same time rigid and need approval from the accounting officer at top management level. The mix of little guidance and supervision with strict financial controls seems to have led to a situation in which regional staff are submitting claims that do not fit requirements and are consequently denied, at times hindering implementation of work plans. As a result, regional officers complain that they are permanently accused of “SMT hunting” while staff at headquarters indeed feels some try to
make unsubstantiated claims. Apparently, more guidance and supervisory mechanisms are needed to reduce friction.

Equally problematic in the face of limited staff is the absence of effective mechanisms to manage out of office time. Most professional staff spends significant time out of office on official travel, meetings or workshops, yet, there are little provisions being made for stand-ins. Handing overs are reported to be incomplete at best and messages are often not taken. As a result, projects often virtually come to a standstill when the responsible officers are out. Overall, management mechanisms do not appear sufficient to always guarantee a sufficient flow of information within the Directorate, between the Directorate and Head Office or between national and regional offices.

Management style

There is a high awareness at the Director’s level about staff concerns and needs are and how management could contribute to address these. This is reflected by the report on the 2002 Strategic Planning Workshop as well as by the interviews conducted. A participatory and enabling management style is considered as the ideal - but admittedly not reality. This is mainly due to the aforementioned general restraints. But while staff acknowledges the difficult situation, they have also pointed out some additional points:

Delegation: Delegation of tasks is mostly hindered by the lack of second level managers. Between the few second level staff present, responsibilities are not always entirely clear and accountability is not always enforced. Yet, there are also problems with the style of delegation that takes place: Staff feel that delegation from the Director’s office often takes place on shortest notice and lacks follow-up. It was also noted, that the Director’s perfectionist attitude often hampered veritable delegation, as she often remained fully involved in delegated tasks, ultimately creating a bottleneck at her office.

Communication: The flow of information on the Directorate’s projects in general and on Take Control in particular is not always sufficient. Staff as well as the Ministry’s top management is not always informed about current issues, general campaign goals and projects. The lack of timely and formal communication with Head Offices appears to be one of the key sources of irritation between the Directorate and top management. Within the Directorate, indications are that staff does not always read circulars and documents and the Director herself pointed out the need for - and is putting added effort into - more personal communication. Communication with the regions is set to improve with the appointment of the Supply Section’s Control Information Officer but still needs improvement regarding information flow on work content.

Goal setting and priorities: The setting of realistic goals and identifying priorities is a key management function. Unfortunately, this function is already undermined by the general discrepancy between the Directorate’s commitments and the resources. Proactive development of priority goals and work plans is hardly possible and action is often taken because monies are available or partners exert pressure. Management reacts more than it acts. Yet, staff interviews and observations yielded that high motivation of the Director result at times in overly optimistic work plans and a lack of setting clear priorities which would be
necessary for the Director to use her personal as well as Directorate’s resources to the best effect.

Overall, it needs to be noted again that there is high awareness in MIB of most if not all of these management issues. While it is encouraged to take action where possible (specifically regarding goal setting and internal communication), a comprehensive improvement of management will be closely connected to an overall improvement in the staff situation.

Leadership

Leadership was one of the key issues brought up by many of the staff interviewed in connection with the Take Control campaign. Specifically, there were concerns whether MIB top management - namely the Permanent Secretary - actually fully backed the campaign. Just as many Take Control partners, many felt that MIB had not taken full ownership of the campaign and differentiated between Take Control and the Ministry’s “actual tasks”. The assumption was that top management disapproved of the amount of time, effort and resources that were used within the Directorate to run Take Control at the expense of other campaigns and publications. Some staff voiced concern that top management had not taken into account actual resources within the Ministry when committing MIB to partnerships such as the UNICEF and UNFPA projects. As a result, staff members tended to either feel that they lacked support in this regard from top management or they used the perceived reservation of their leadership to foster their own scepticism towards Take Control at MIB.

The Permanent Secretary is well aware of these issues and clarified top management’s stance towards Take Control: He pointed out that it is at times hard for top management to back the campaign as they simply did not always know what Take Control was doing. At the moment, too many decisions are taken by the Director and outside donors. UNICEF, for instance, had not involved MIB leadership in decision-making regarding campaign activities since AHPP project officer Rick Olson had left the country and his position had been vacant. In such a situation, MIB leadership obviously would create a “buffer zone” between Take Control and the Ministry as they felt that while they did not want to frustrate the efforts of the campaign and its donors, it was hard to back and possibly defend measures taken without their consultation. More communication about activities and a stronger involvement of top management in decision-making would allow an increased backing of the campaign.

However, the Permanent Secretary did underscore that while management appreciated the enthusiasm of the Director for HIV & AIDS communication, there were indeed concerns that Take Control at times appeared to be the sole focus of the Directorate. Also, it was feared that the growing dependence of Take Control on the Director’s person would make it hard for MIB to take over the campaign if she was to leave. The general awareness of an increased need for resources and ownership is high.
6. Partnership between UNICEF and MIB

Obviously, the role of UNICEF as MIB’s key partner in the running of Take Control is not a capacity issue. Yet, as this paper also aims to serve as a basis on which the cooperation can be improved, results regarding that role are presented here.

Past experiences with the UN

MIB has a history of working with UN agencies that reaches far beyond Take Control. Since 1996, its Directorate AVM - and later the Directorate PM - have been the counterpart of UNFPA’s Population IEC Project. Under this programme, a technical assistant (TA) was seconded to MIB to get the project off the ground. The key problem at that time was that the TA operated “in a bubble”, within but more or less isolated from the MIB structure. This was also due to the fact that the TA was at no time assigned a MIB counterpart. As a result, it took a long time for MIB to embrace the project, even after it was taken over by Deputy Director Hilda Nakakuwa who was moved to the Directorate PM to oversee the section Information, Education and Communication Advocacy formed to handle the project.

Ownership

Concerns are that Take Control similarly was not “naturalised” into the MIB structure and depends mainly on the personal commitment of Director Rianne Selle. Based on the interviews conducted, some assumptions can be made why UN supported projects are not always seen by MIB as integral parts of its mission: For one, both UN-projects are much better resourced than other campaigns. As a result, there are much more opportunities - and outside pressure - for staff to move things within these projects and, consequently, these projects end up taking up most of the time of the assigned staff. But the fact that these projects rely to a large degree on outside funds has still more implications.

Campaign autonomy

Being supported with substantial funds from UNICEF and UNFPA, the Directorate of PM has developed a high degree of autonomy in decision-making and implementation. This goes as far as the Directorate - in cooperation with its UN partners and other donors - at times approving activities or materials under the label of Take Control that the Ministry’s leadership might not easily endorse - and is not asked to endorse for that matter. The idea that Take Control is not a “real” MIB activity is thus used to bypass MIB leadership when needed. The Director can withdraw to her “outside” position of Take Control chairperson to take decisions that could be vetoed within MIB’s structure. In short, the authority of MIB’s top management is undermined by the large share of outside funds and close involvement UNICEF has crafted with the Director in her double function as MIB representative and Take Control chair.

While this certainly is detrimental to MIB taking more ownership of Take Control, the campaign also has benefited from this set-up: It needs to be kept in mind that current Government policy would not even allow MIB to support the placement of advertisements in the country’s leading daily The Namibian. Also - as has also been experienced during the running of the Multimedia Campaign against Violence against Women - the campaign is free to address even controversial issues or even issues criticising Government.
Interagency coordination

UNFPA’s Population IEC and UNICEF’s *Take Control* project are *de facto* unified in the Ministry under the Directorate PM. Yet, coordination between these two projects on the UN-side is perceived as poor by MIB. Both agencies were urged to explore ways in which they can better integrate their projects. Ideally, MIB would like to handle only one account for both agencies and introduce joint planning, reporting and monitoring. As a first step it was proposed to include UNFPA in the UNICEF steering committee as counterparts were similar and projects were complementing each other.
7. Summary & Discussion

This second part of the paper looked at the capacities of MIB’s Directorate of Print Media to manage the national Take Control HIV & AIDS media campaign. The main purpose was to identify capacity gaps that would need to be addressed to improve management and eventually allow MIB to fully take on the coordination of the campaign. It examined the Directorate’s structure, equipment, financial and human resources but also issues around management and leadership. Following key capacities and capacity constraints were identified:

**Capacities & capacity restraints**

**Structure:** The approved structure of the Directorate makes provisions for 110 posts at headquarters and regional levels. Regarding overall size, the structure is sufficient. It boasts a strong outreach component with ten regional offices. However, in the approved structure of the Directorate, the handling of campaigns falls under the section *Periodicals and Exhibitions* and a section *Information, Education and Communication Advocacy* created at a later stage for the Population IEC project. It appears that the management of larger media campaigns was originally not envisaged. In any case, the original structure does not make provision for sufficient personnel at these sections – that have been *de facto* combined - to manage a campaign of the scope of *Take Control*, let alone a number of other national campaigns. In response to this situation, the Directorate pulled together staff resources (reassignment of *Namibia Review* media officers, employment of a development worker) to strengthen this section. Also, a new structure of the Directorate has been drafted to reshuffle approved posts in a manner that is more in line with current responsibilities and tasks. While the last draft is addressing the problem by strengthening the campaign section’s link with the regional offices as well as providing for positions dealing with M & E and networking, it still does not make sufficient provision for advocacy and media advocacy and – more importantly – campaign development and event coordination. These functions have arisen as crucial during the partner interviews and over the last years of running *Take Control*. Submission and approval of an updated structure is thus urgently needed and should take these areas into account.

**Staffing:** The key challenge to the Directorate’s work is the severe understaffing of the structure: Less than half of the approved posts are budgeted for (53) and even less are actually filled (44). Most notably, second level managers that would guide lower rank staff and oversee project implementation are missing. The lack of sufficient staff affects all parts of the Directorate and is hampering its overall performance. It is also at the core of many other problems (management, job satisfaction, project ownership). The staff shortage hardly allows the Directorate to live up to its numerous commitments under MTP III, the cooperation with...
UN agencies and the many other tasks it is thought to perform as the communication link between Government and the public. While the Global Fund monies might bring temporary relief through its staff component, the hiring of more regular staff will be a necessity for the Directorate if it is to perform all its duties. On the positive side, all ten regional offices are still staffed and operational.

**Qualifications:** Staff shortage is compounded in many areas by a lack of adequate qualification of existing staff. While MIB has a fair share of employees with solid journalistic background, there is limited experience in the development and running of campaigns. Information work skills have mainly been developed on the job, albeit with little exposure to professional concepts. In the absence of senior staff in that field, there have been little opportunities for the transfer of skills. Similarly, technical assistance has not yielded desired skill transfers as TA’s often filled in on vacancies without counterparts to work with. Attracting and retaining qualified staff has always been a challenge in MIB due to low salary scales and a work environment allegedly not attractive for media workers. At least, Namibia Review’s good reputation has made it an attractive employer for upcoming journalists. It has, however, proven difficult to retain writers and to motivate them to contribute to writing for IEC and campaigns.

Also, training opportunities for existing staff have been rare. However, first steps have been taken to support staff in pursuing studies and qualifying courses. Also, there is staff that can support – and already has been doing so – campaigns with selected graphic design and audiovisual production tasks.

**Project ownership:** While there is strong commitment to Take Control and HIV & AIDS communication from the Director and also among most regional staff interviewed, MIB as a whole has not have taken full ownership of the media campaign. Staff as well as top management has concerns that Take Control is taking up too much of the Directorate’s work at the expense of other duties. Next to the Director’s commitment, this has, however, also to do with the fact that Take Control is disproportionately better resourced than most other campaigns and therefore offers more opportunities for implementation. Also, once again, the reduced number of staff available makes it hard for the Directorate to live up to all its obligations. Ownership is, however, also eroded by poor communication by the Director as well as by UNICEF and other donors with top management. Decision-making is de facto often done outside MIB structures or at Directorate level, which has caused MIB leadership to support Take Control only cautiously as they are not always informed and have not always endorsed campaign activities.

**Resources:** On the whole, the Directorate’s equipment is currently sufficient. There remains, however, a small share of the team that does not have computers. Also, a substantial part of the transport and communications equipment is old and will need to be replaced in the near future. Global Fund monies have been earmarked to address the upgrading of vehicles and computers. The main remaining constraint observed is the lack of intranet/internet services. Linking offices within headquarters as well as regional offices through e-mail services would greatly facilitate the flow of information among the team. Bringing the Directorate and the regions online is a priority at MIB’s IT unit and well underway, but some support in funding modems and connections for Regional Offices might still be needed.
Financially, the *Take Control* campaign is fairly well resourced with about 2,000,000 N$ available for core activities (information materials, mass media materials, WAD events) in 2003. While funding is secure in the short term, the almost complete dependence of the campaign on outside funds might be a problem for sustainability. Also, the large proportion of money coming from UNICEF/UNFPA have made it difficult for the campaign to reach beyond the audience of young people. The Global Fund will bring some relief in this regard but in the medium term a diversification of funding sources will be necessary. Acquiring more operational funds already is an issue for most of the other, less well-resourced campaigns.

**Staff morale:** Even though many staff – especially in the regions – like their line of work, the work environment in the Directorate has led to overall low staff morale. Many staff lack a sense of purpose and direction, resulting mainly from missing supervision and guidance in the depleted management structure. Equally, many have a feeling that their work is not acknowledged. Low salaries and scarce promotion and growth opportunities compound the situation. As a consequence, there is little willingness to take on responsibility or extra work.

**Management issues:** Management is also strongly affected by the lack of staff. Delegation to second level managers is often not possible simply because there are none. Supervision of and communication with regional offices has virtually ceased over the larger part of 2003 due to an unfilled vacancy at headquarters. A lack of communication seems to exist throughout the whole structure: staff only has little information about what the directorate’s goals, commitments and challenges are. This also affects the attitudes towards *Take Control*. Equally, top management is not always informed timely and thoroughly about issues related to the campaign. While the Director has high awareness of these problems, staff shortages make it difficult to address them.

Having become a clearer view on what capacities – and constraints – are within the Directorate PM and on what the needs for an improved campaign management are, Part III will integrate these results. It will focus on developing ideas on what can be done, to better manage *Take Control* and other campaigns with the resources at hand.
Part III:
Ways forward
Exploring ways to improve campaign management
8. Meeting the Needs

Exploring realistic ways to strengthen MIB’s capacity to manage information campaigns

During the first step of the exercise, Take Control was assessed by key players in HIV & AIDS education to find out in what ways the campaign needed to be improved. As a second step, the coordinating body of the campaign, MIB’s Directorate Print Media, was scrutinized to evaluate its capacities and to identify what constraints affected the campaign management.

In the third phase, an attempt was made to reconcile the results of the prior parts: A process was started to explore how the Directorate could use its current as well as expected future resources to address capacity gaps and improve not only the handling of Take Control, but the handling of campaigns in general.

As a first step, the consultant translated the priority areas for improvement identified in the first part into specific campaign management functions that the Directorate would have to efficiently perform to address these challenges. It was then examined in how far the current structures and capacities were conducive to perform these functions and proposed actions were formulated. The results were then presented to the campaign team in the Directorate and to the concerned UNICEF officer for discussion. The draft recommendations were then altered in line with the input.

The group agreed, however, that the overriding key constraint to improving the Directorate’s campaign work was the lack of staff. At the same time, the Directorate has reason to hope that the disbursement of Global Fund monies as well as a successful motivation for the unfreezing of some budgeted regular posts will provide means to employ at least some of the desperately needed additional staff in the near future. Against this background, an extra effort was undertaken to find the best ways to use future staff for an improved campaign management. To do so, the consultant facilitated a second brainstorming session with Directorate’s campaign team to jointly explore how the Directorate could perform most of the needed functions with the number of staff that realistically could be recruited in the near future.

The results of this participatory attempt to develop a possible way forward are presented in Part III.

8.1 Needs and Functions

Identifying key functions to address campaign management requirements

As result of the outside campaign assessment, a number of key areas of improvement were identified. It will be necessary to:

- strengthen of legitimacy through leadership commitment,
- concentrate on core activities such as IEC, the media campaign and key events,
- increase the involvement and improve communication of partners,
- develop clear and realistic strategies and workplans,
- improve involvement of target audiences and regions,
- improve monitoring and evaluation,
- broaden the funding base.
In general, a strengthening of media campaign development and implementation as well as of event coordination capacities will be necessary for the Directorate to fully take on the handling of the campaign.

To address these issues, the Directorate PM will have to (more) effectively perform a number of campaign management and related functions. This section identifies what these functions are. It is then examined, in how far capacities exist to perform these functions. As the shortage of staff is one of the main issues in strengthening capacity, it will be separately discussed what staff realistically could take on these functions taken. Thus, the paper will also reflect the work process that has led to the ideas and recommendations made.

**Identifying campaign management functions**

Based on what is needed to improve the handling of the campaign, following campaign management functions can be identified:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign needs</th>
<th>Functions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved legitimacy through official endorsement</td>
<td>Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrating on and managing core activities (IEC &amp; media campaign)</td>
<td>Campaign development &amp; coordination (planning) Campaign implementation (creative direction) Material development Text Material development Design Material development AV Media planning Supply &amp; production management Research &amp; evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrating on and managing core activities (events)</td>
<td>Event coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase involvement of and communication with partners</td>
<td>Partner networking Media advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase involvement and communication with regions, reach to the regions</td>
<td>Regional networking &amp; supervision Distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve campaign testing, monitoring &amp; evaluation</td>
<td>Research, monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve input from target groups</td>
<td>Partner networking Research, monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broaden funding base</td>
<td>Fundraising &amp; reporting Financial accounting</td>
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</table>

Current staff already performs some of these functions, others are not tended to at all. What the current situation in relation to all these functions is and how the performance can be improved will be discussed below.

**8.2 Functions and Capacities**

*Discussion of key functions and related capacity issues*

In this section, the key fields in which *Take Control* will have to become active to meet the expectations of its partners and run an effective campaign are listed. For every field, there is a brief description of what is entailed and a discussion of related MIB capacity issues. These
functions are not to be confused with posts, i.e. not every function necessarily warrants for a position. What functions could be performed by who is being discussed in greater detail under 8.3. There, it will also be discussed whether or what staff would need to be hired. Below, only actions are proposed that do not involve the increase of the staff component.

**Function “Representation”**

**Description:** *Take Control* needs high-level representation in the public and on intergovernmental level to increase visibility and to strengthen legitimacy and credibility.

**Status:** Representation is not so much a capacity as it is an advocacy issue. Top management of MIB is currently not taking full ownership of *Take Control* for reasons described in Part II. Namely, the involvement of and communication with the Permanent Secretary by the Director as well as by donors is insufficient. Efforts to regain leadership’s interest and support of the campaign have already been stepped up in the course of this research exercise.

**Proposed actions:** Involvement of MIB top management needs to be improved. Communicating campaign goals and activities within MIB (from Directorate up) as well as by UNICEF and other donors will be necessary. Eventually, it could be discussed whether representatives of MIB and MOHSS leadership (such as the future Director of NACOP) could jointly support the campaign as official patrons to attract more media interest and increase legitimacy.

**Function “Fundraising & reporting”**

**Description:** To broaden its donor base (for instance to thus acquire funds for activities targeting groups other than youth) *Take Control* will have to lobby for funds – inside and outside Government structures. Fundraising would also be necessary to better the resource situation of other campaigns.

**Status:** While this would in theory be part of the Directors’ or Deputy Directors’ work, the current staff situation does not allow for meaningful pursuit of fundraising activities. The lack of staff to administrate and account for funds also is an impediment to attracting more outside funding.

**Proposed Actions:** With short-term funding secured, this might not be an immediate priority. This function should, however, be considered if recruitment of a Deputy Director will become possible. UNICEF could provide additional training.

**Function “Campaign development”**

**Description:** This obviously is a key function. It would involve the initiation and guidance of a joint annual strategy process and the overseeing of according campaign implementation. The job would involve very good communication planning skills, negotiation skills and the ability to supervise media campaign as well as event implementation of the strategy.

**Status:** There is currently no staff member with thorough training in this field. Strategy processes have so far mainly been pushed forward through external, technical assistance.
**Proposed actions:** This is a key function to be covered by future staff. If such staff is hired through the Global Fund, a special emphasis will have to be put on skill transfer in the period of time that the post is financed.

*Functions “Media campaign coordination” & “Media planning”*

**Description:** This would involve the identification, briefing and supervision of internal and external production partners to ensure implementation of agreed strategy in the media.

**Status:** The Directorate has worked with outside service providers before but mainly through the Director or the editor of *Namibia Review*. There is also some capacity for IEC material development by second level management, but it will need further strengthening. It can be expected that all current staff have good knowledge of internal capacities and work processes.

**Proposed actions:** Closely connected with campaign development, the proposed actions are similar.

*Function “Event coordination”*

**Description:** This function refers to the organization of smaller events as well as supervision and liaison with outside service providers (such as *World AIDS Day* committees) to ensure that events tie in with the agreed strategy and integrate with other campaign components, namely the media campaign. It also includes identifying and organising representation of MIB events at outside events.

**Status:** This function has in the past been executed partially by the Information Officer in the *Take Control* secretariat or – in the case of larger events such as *World AIDS Day* – entirely by a subcommittee. Last year’s experience with the complete outside handling has shown that this link between the outside production committee, the *Take Control* partners and the media campaign is missing dearly. Among other reasons, this gap in capacity has influenced the recent decision to scale down 2004 *World AIDS Day* activities.

**Proposed action:** Overall, networking with partners will have to improve. This will have to be done across posts. Yet, there will probably a need to create a position for an event manager to oversee larger events. Smaller events (workshops, forums) can be organised in-house with support of the Secretariat. A focus on a small number of key events that will be organised by the Directorate itself will be necessary to make targeted use of resources.

*Function “Media advocacy”*

**Description:** Media partners have indicated that their increased involvement would hinge on a more direct and qualified contact, for instance through a press officer. Function would involve to liaise on a regular basis with journalists (facilitation of press club), backup campaign themes with human-interest stories and other PR, as well as to take on media planning and placement activities for the campaign.
**Status:** To strengthen Media Liaisons was one of the duties that the development worker was tasked with. Unfortunately, the development worker had very little background in the field of media and communication and little was done in the area. However, the Directorate has a number of people that have a journalistic background in its subdivisions and in the regions. Yet, all of them are needed in the positions that they currently fill. It is somewhat questionable whether the Ministry will be able to attract an adequately qualified person (on Information Officer level) given the problems Namibia Review is experiencing with recruiting and retaining journalists.

**Proposed action:** If indeed a fully-fledged PR officer cannot be attracted with current salaries, it might be considered to train a person on the job. This could be done through the MIB Media Liaison office, the UNICEF Communication Unit or through technical assistance. In general, the cooperation with the MIB Media Liaison Unit should be strengthened to coordinate media advocacy activities.

*Function “Partner networking”*

**Description:** One of the core activities to muster more participation, support and ownership is increased networking with partners. This involves improved as well as more targeted and relevant communication with partners through written and interpersonal channels.

**Status:** DED has seconded a development worker to specifically assist with networking and outreach activities (not a full position as he also serves for DED internally). The networking activities undertaken have had immediate results in terms of attendance and involvement of partners in *Take Control* activities. However, due to overall low staff levels in the project, the development worker eventually took on a number of other tasks, compromising on networking. Also, in the absence of any local counterpart to be trained, this posting will not be renewed.

**Proposed Actions:** There is strong need for networking, especially regarding the management of multi-sectoral campaigns. Increased networking should therefore become a part of the work of all campaign staff. The setting up of meetings and the filtering, improved presentation and dissemination of general campaign information should probably be taken on again by the campaign secretariat. Training for improved writing and presentation skills would, however, be needed.

*Function “Regional networking”*

**Description:** This function concerns the coordination and supervision of campaign implementation by the regional offices. It also ensures that information about regional needs and experiences feed back into the campaign mechanisms.

**Status:** Supervision and support systems of regional offices have been stripped bare for most of 2003 and regional offices have at times been operating with virtually no guidance. With the appointment of a Control Information Officer logistical support of the regions will be strengthened again. However, the responsible officer is not tasked to guide and evaluate the way campaigns are implemented in the regions. In the absence of any other staff, this function
has rested with the Director who could not effectively perform it in the face of the multitude of commitments. Internally, a better link to regional offices has been identified as priority.

**Proposed action:** Even if posts will not be budgeted in the foreseeable future, the priority on regional linkage should be upheld. At least a core structure of 2 Information Officers should be employed through the Global Fund.

*Function “Distribution”*

**Description:** This refers to the dissemination of all campaign materials not only to regional offices but also to all partners. It would also entail the identification, facilitation and management of strategic distribution partnerships.

**Status:** Distribution is currently lodged with the library where irregular mailings to GRN offices and selected other outlets are done. There is no efficient monitoring of distribution through this office nor is there a well maintained database to facilitate targeted and efficient mailings. There is no official to facilitate and coordinate distribution partnerships. There will also be no space within the Directorate to store materials currently kept in the warehouse.

Most of the *Take Control* distribution continues to be processed by UNICEF (coordination) and the NYC (warehouse). UNICEF has developed a computerized database and run a beta-version during the past 3 months without serious problems. UNICEF is also employing a UN volunteer to handle incoming orders as well as regular mailings but processes still need to be formalized.

**Proposed action:** All distribution of *Take Control* should be handled through the NYC warehouse to relieve library staff of the labour involved in packaging. The handling of all orders and regular mailings is to migrate to the Library at MIB. As the handling of incoming orders will result in significant higher workload, the section would have to be strengthened. It should be explored whether UNICEF can support the section through a UNV to facilitate the taking over of distribution activities. The current database will need to be upgraded if it is to be used to support distribution of all campaign and IEC materials produced through the Directorate.

*Function “Research, monitoring & evaluation”*

**Description:** Identification and coordination of research needs, specifically in the area of campaign guidance and assessment. It would involve the initiation or cooperation of research/assessment/pre-testing activities through MIB’s own network or partner organizations to ensure campaigns are well guided and are reaching their goals.

**Status:** There are currently no capacities in this area at MIB. NYC has offered support through its structure for pre-testing and evaluation of campaign materials by young people, but obviously research training would have to be conducted. There will be increased demand for Monitoring and Evaluation by the Global Fund.

**Proposed action:** As M&E demands will rise with the disbursement of Global Fund monies, a post eventually will have to be created for this. Research and assessment gaps can also be
filled by a step up of smart partnerships (such as NASOMA RAP) and with the help of UNICEF and UNFPA.

Function “Outreach”

Description: Outreach work refers mainly to the regional offices. All constituencies are to be reached timely with campaign themes and IEC materials.

Status: It appears that Regional Officers are fairly active with fieldwork and the Directorate has adopted a policy that requires the RIO’s to visit every constituency in their region at least once in a period of three months. Outreach work is in some instances hampered by poor vehicles that are often in need of repairs. Main weaknesses are currently, however, supervision and guidance of field work, including the careful analysis of and feedback on monthly reports. Also, SMT payments are at times a contentious issue, which will be further aggravated if plans to cut SMT by 50% will be enforced.

Proposed action: Supervision and guidance of regional officers needs to be significantly strengthened as outlined under “Regional networking”. A clear communication about rules and regulations for the planning of and compensation for outreach work will defuse issues around SMT. The current SMT budget will need to be maintained if the regional representatives are to perform their duties.

Function “Material development – Text”

Description: Even with large parts of material production handled by outside service providers, experience has shown that the responsibility to write technical copy will still rest with the campaign. Therefore, capacities for the writing of IEC materials in general, and for monthly formats such as the bulletin will be needed.

Status: The Directorate publishes the magazine Namibia Review. Its editor as well as the Director have very good writing skills. However, there is little writing capacity at lower levels. Namibia Review is struggling to attract and retain journalists. Also, in the past journalists were reluctant to write IEC materials. Accordingly, the Directorate has had difficulties to efficiently write and create content for materials and much had to be done with the involvement of the Director.

At the NYC, there are currently two student interns and there are plans to support the editorial structure of Open Talk more permanently through the placement of UN volunteers.

Proposed action: In the face of low capacity in the Directorate’s structure, plans to strengthen writing skills at Open Talk should be further pursued. If new staff is hired at MIB, journalistic or copywriting skills should be considered. When hiring Namibia Review staff, the support of IEC material development needs to be part of the terms of reference.
Function “Material development – Design”

**Description:** This function would involve the graphic design of recurrent IEC materials (e.g. bulletin), updating and amending of existing series of IEC (e.g. *How to Guides*) and the production of ad hoc materials.

**Status:** The structure of the Directorate makes currently provisions for two graphic artists but only employs one. He has not been trained as a graphic designer but as an illustrator and artist, but has managed to acquire most of the skills on the job. Yet, the fact that UNICEF and *Namibia Review* have decided not to work with the in-house designer reflects that there are still shortcomings. The designer has, however, successfully taken over the production of the *Take Control* bulletin. The equipment at the section is partially somewhat old but fully operational.

**Proposed action:** The designer should be re-involved in increased design work within the scope outlined in the description. To keep up the quality level of current materials, there still will be need of outside design skills for development of new materials.

Function “Material development – Audiovisual”

**Description:** This function involves support of audiovisual productions, production of ad hoc materials, AV documentation of events, editing.

**Status:** The consultant had no mandate to examine capacities at the Directorate Audiovisual and could only rely on information given by its Director. According to him, the Directorate is committed to support campaigns at PM. The Directorate boasts now digital editing suites and is currently training a young team on its use. All 13 regions have been equipped with digital cameras and there are plans to also open more regional editing studios next to the existing one in Oshakati. However, regional staff has no training yet in working with the cameras. At headquarters, capacities for professional recording are given, but problems remain with the sound quality. As key weakness, the Director identified script-writing and material development skills.

**Proposed action:** Technical capacities (and specifically timeliness of implementation) should be probed again with smaller projects. If areas such as editing or camera recording prove to be up to par, ways should be considered to integrate outside production capacities with internal ones (for instance an outside director with a MIB camera team). This could also serve to strengthen capacities and skills within MIB.

Function “Supply services”

**Description:** Campaigns are usually supply intensive. Large amounts of material production need to be handled and this requires supply as well as production skills.

**Status:** Current support services in the directorate only handle the purchase and maintenance of equipment and materials needed for the operation of the Directorate’s offices. Procurement of campaign materials and services (such as printing) is handled by the responsible sections.
themselves. However, virtually all supply functions for *Take Control* are currently processed by UNICEF’s supply section.

**Proposed action:** It would be best to concentrate on improving campaign management structures before putting on the extra burden of supply and production management on the fragile structure at the Directorate.

*Function “Finance & accounting”*

**Description:** The use of outside funds should be documented and monitored within the Directorate to improve reporting and accountability.

**Status:** The Directorate has no financial post of its own as all finances are to be handled by head office. Within the Directorate, the Population IEC project has fully taken over the handling of funds with negative results. Opinions differed whether negligence, mismanagement or a lack of skills was to blame. Either way, the image of MIB to handle outside funds was tarnished.

**Proposed action:** A financial assistant would relieve project staff and increase control over funds. This could help restore trust in MIB structures for handling money. UNFPA has signalled willingness to support such a post if the project asked for it.

### 8.3 Proposed Future Staff Functions

**Ideas to resolve the staff situation**

At the heart of most capacity restraints within the Directorate is the lack of staff. Even if the Directorate cannot expect to fill a larger number of position identified in its approved structure, chances are, that the situation will improve somewhat in the course of the year. It is expected that limited funds become available to hire urgently needed staff for the campaigns section.

In the course of this exercise a special effort was undertaken to explore ways how these resources can best be used for the Directorate to perform as many of the campaign management functions discussed as possible. This was done in a participatory manner, involving the Director as well as concerned key staff. The results of this brainstorming are presented in this section.

**Expected resources**

The Directorate expects to be able to strengthen its team in the course of the year through various ways: it will receive xxx US$ through the Global Fund. Up to 10% of this budget can be spent on personnel. It is expected that at the current exchange rate this will allow to employ two staff at Information Officer and one at Chief Information Officer level for a period of two years. Should the US-dollar strengthen, it might be possible to up one Information Officer level to Chief Information Officer.
The Directorate has also requested the management to motivate the un-freezing of the budgets for previously approved and budgeted posts. If the Ministry of Finance grants the request, it will be possible to hire three more information/media officers, a Deputy Director and a private secretary for the Director.

It was pointed out in the paper, that there also is hope that UNFPA would support the employment of a finance assistant for the Population IEC Project. It was also discussed to move a UN volunteer – possibly the one that is currently working with UNICEF AHPP – to the Directorate to support the handling of the distribution.

The discussion was based on the assumption that all these positions can be filled.

*Forming a “special unit”?*

The idea of forming a special, semi-autonomous unit to manage and coordinate the campaign surfaced not only during the partner interviews but was also brought up by some within MIB. In response, it was first discussed whether such an approach could make sense.

The idea is to establish a unit that is tasked jointly by MOHSS and MIB (or by NAEC as a multi sectoral decision-making body) to take on the everyday work of campaign management on the basis of an annually agreed strategy. It could be housed by and attached to MIB but remain autonomous in many of its functions. The level of supervision by MIB would have to be determined. Proponents had various reasons why they suggested this path: some felt, it might decrease the role that *Take Control* is playing within the Directorate. Mainly independently resourced through the Global Fund monies, the unit would relieve the Directorate’s team from a larger part of the coordination work and allow them to tackle other issues. A placement somewhat outside official Government structures could also allow the unit to offer more competitive albeit limited contracts. It was also hoped, that leaner and more flexible structures would allow for more efficient and dynamic work processes. Controversial issues could be more addressed more comfortably by a more autonomous unit. It was also cited that if such a unit would have independent financial reporting, it could address the emerging reluctance of donors to channel funds through the Ministry.

On the other hand, the creation of a more or less independent *Take Control* unit would be hardly conducive to strengthen campaign legitimacy and ownership. Equally, an opportunity would be wasted to improve general campaign management capacities in the Directorate and to create a sustainable structure that will be able to tackle future communication issues. More practically, it is questionable whether the resources available will actually be sufficient to create such a unit.

During the joint discussion of this issue, the Directorate’s team felt that it would be better to use the resources available to the benefit of the whole Directorate to ultimately strengthen general campaign management capacities. It was felt that a special unit would lead to a further alienation of *Take Control* from Government. Also, if the staff in such a unit were to be paid better than other employees, demotivation and dissatisfaction in the Directorate would increase.
### Filling the structure

Based on the proposed structure for the Directorate, it was then discussed which positions could be filled with future staff and what functions exactly that staff should be taking on. The goal was to create some sort of “working version” of the proposed structure that would not give up the claim to an adequately staffed Directorate but would allow making campaign management work with the current and potential resources at hand.

The group identified campaign development and the management of the media campaign and events as priority functions. The need to strengthen coordination with regions and partners was also ranked high. Monitoring and evaluation was seen as an emerging issue with increased requirements from the Global Fund. Finally, some capacity in the field of text development was seen as crucial as was improved material distribution and financial reporting.

Functions such as fundraising, supply and production management but also the strengthening of material development capacities (graphic, AV design) were assigned lower priorities.

To ensure that the Directorate can perform at least the priority functions, the group suggested filling the proposed structure in the following manner:

Campaign development and coordination functions would rest with the head of the aptly dubbed Subdivision Campaign development and coordination. It was suggested to move the current coordinator of the Population IEC project (Chief Information Officer) to this position and allow him to grow into this management task. This would be facilitated by strong support from the new Deputy Director as well as from a coordinator for the media campaigns to be hired with Global Fund money. It could also be considered to give further training or technical assistance to the Chief Information Officer. The Deputy Director with the support of the Director would be responsible to communicating results with top management and to facilitate the process of mustering official approval for campaigns. He or she would also ensure that all campaigns are properly resourced and reported for.

Below the level of the head of the campaigns subdivision, a slight adjustment of the proposed structure was considered: Instead of splitting coordination tasks by projects (Policy & Development Campaigns and Population IEC), it might make more sense to divide according to functions, employing one media specialist and one event coordinator. With support from the secretariat they would implement campaign activities.
Filling the Structure

Ideas towards a working version of the proposed structure of the Directorate Print Media/Publications & Information Coordination

Assumptions:
1 Deputy Director, 3 Information Officers, 1 Private Secretary budgeted for.
2 Chief Information Officers, 1 Information Officer budgeted for two years through Global Fund. Assistance through the UN system with one Financial Assistant and 1 UN Volunteer.

Color Code:
- Currently filled
- To be filled through additional budget
- To be filled through Global Fund
- To be filled with UN assistance
- Approved but not budgeted for
This would on the even side involve the coordination of organisation mechanisms for larger events (for instance to be the Ministry’s link with and driving force behind *World AIDS Day* committees) as well as the organisation of smaller events such as workshops or discussion forums. The event coordinator would also ensure representation in other events. The media coordinator would oversee and facilitate the translation of approved strategies into mass media campaign materials. Both posts could be financed through the Global Fund, as they would be crucial for the implementation of social mobilisation activities envisaged under the plan.

The post of the secretary is filled and the secretariat would continue to assist in the organisation of smaller events and further the communication with partners. Improved partner networking will, however, be a function that needs to be taken on across the structure and mainly by the event and media coordination officers.

To meet increased M & E demands from the Global Fund, an M & E officer would be employed with the fund’s money.

It will hardly be possible to realise the ambitious scale-up of regional coordination envisaged in the proposed structure. Yet, an improved regional networking remains a priority to ensure that campaigns are brought into the regions. Thus, it was suggested to at least seek to employ to regional liaison officers to guide and supervise campaign implementation in northern and southern regions. Equally, the prospects of attracting a larger number of qualified writers for *Namibia Review* and campaigns remain bleak. Also, journalists at the review have traditionally been reluctant to support IEC material production. Therefore, it was suggested to try to get an Information Officer for the Campaigns section that could take on text development and possibly also take up media advocacy tasks. If it proved not possible to attract a qualified writer, a person should be selected that could be trained on the job, for instance through technical assistance.

The distribution function of the library could be strengthened if the UN volunteer currently handling distribution at UNICEF would migrate to the Directorate. This would also be a first step for the Ministry towards fully taking over the management of material dissemination. It is also hoped that the UN can assist the Directorate with funding for a financial assistant to improve accounting and financial reporting.

An overview of how current and potential staff could be used to improve the Directorate’s campaign management capacities is presented on the next page. It is also described in greater detail, which staff would take on what functions in this working structure.

*Working structure job descriptions*

Based on the discussion with the Directorate’s team and the resulting working structure, the consultant formulated what the key tasks of concerned staff in this structure would be. The focus was on functions related to campaign management rather than on internal management duties. As such, the following descriptions are thought to illustrate in greater detail how the working structure covers key duties.
Deputy Director:
In line with the current job description the focus of the Deputy Directors work remains the planning of campaigns, the supervision of the campaigns subdivision, budgeting and general support of the Director in management duties and representation on internal and external committees.

Under the current terms of references and based on the brainstorming, following duties would also be taken up by the Deputy Director:

- Guidance of strategy development processes for campaigns. This includes support and guidance to the head of the campaigns subdivision in facilitating annual strategy and work plan formulation processes with key stakeholders. With support from the Director, the Deputy Director also seeks high-level endorsement (for instance at NAEC) of strategies if needed.

- External and internal fundraising for campaigns to ensure that all campaigns are adequately resourced. Reports to outside donors and partners.

- Authorisation of campaign materials developed based on strategy.

- Communication of campaign subdivision activities to Director and top management.

The Deputy Directors’ role should give Director more time to focus on policy implementation, representation, liaison with institutions, communication with top management and general staff management and supervision.

Reports to:
Director

Ideal background:
Advanced degree in social sciences, preferably communication or marketing related, extensive public sector experience, excellent analytical thinking and writing skills,

Head Subdivision Campaigns
The head of the subdivision would work closely with the Deputy Director to oversee the campaigns subdivision. A Control Information Officer should actually fill the position. In the absence of adequate funds it was suggested to fill it with the Chief Information Officer currently coordinating the Population IEC project. Duties would include:

- Under guidance of the Deputy Director and with support of the media and event coordinators facilitation of strategy development processes. Oversees development of annual work plans for the various campaigns.

- Strong emphasis on involvement of partners in the process of strategy development for multisectoral campaigns. Facilitates strategic partnerships with outside partners.
Breaks down strategies into activities jointly with media and events coordinators and supervises implementation of these activities. Allocation of budgets to specific activities and control thereof.

Evaluates, coordinates and responds to external project proposals in line with strategies.

Coordinates M&E activities and ensures input from M&E into planning processes and campaign implementation.

Reports to:
Deputy Director

Ideal background:
Extensive experience and/or degree in public information, (social) marketing, communication. Understanding of campaign development processes from research and planning to implementation. #

Coordinator media campaign:
On the level below the head of the subdivision, two professionals deal with the classic media component of campaigns (mass media, small media) and events respectively. Both positions would ideally be filled on Chief Information Officer level. Duties of the media campaign coordinator would include:

Translation of campaign strategy into mass media materials. This would include identification, briefing and supervision of outside creative service providers.

Development of IEC and campaign materials with internal resources (creative direction).

Networking and involvement of partners in partner-driven campaigns.

Networking with key media partners and facilitation of media partnerships, media planning.

Supervision and guidance of regional coordination officers, distribution officer (jointly with event coordinator).

Integration of activities with event coordination officer.

Reports to:
Head of subdivision
Ideal background:
Advertising, (social) marketing, public relations, excellent understanding of creative design processes, good production skills print and AV, good contacts with media and advertising practitioners, development background desirable

Coordinator events:
Duties of the event coordinator would include:

- Break down of strategies in events and below the line (non-mass media) activities. This includes the facilitation of own events as well as the representation of campaigns at important outside events.
- Networking and involvement of partners in partner-driven campaigns (e.g. facilitating events subcommittees).
- Organisation of smaller events (workshops, discussion forums, launches) with the assistance of the secretariat.
- Identification and supervision of outside service providers and/or events subcommittees.
- Cooperation with internal partners (e.g. Directorate AVM for video shows).

Reports to:
Head of subdivision

Ideal background:
Practical experience over academics: good track record of event production, solid budgeting and organisational planning skills,

Campaign Secretary:
The campaign secretariat would render support to both coordinators in organisation, production and networking. Duties would be similar to those in the current Information Officers job description albeit with more focus on logistical support to the events coordinator and networking tasks such as regular communication with campaign partners. It would not include so much IEC and mass media material development, which would be taken on by the campaign writer.

Reports to:
Events & media campaign coordinator

Ideal background:
Experienced information worker with good organisational talent and excellent communication skills. Good writing skills would be of advantage.
Monitoring & Evaluation Officer:
As monitoring requirements will increase with the disbursement of Global Fund money, it was suggested to take the opportunity and use the funds to employ an officer that could strengthen M & E in the subdivision. Duties would included:

- Identification of campaign research needs (for planning and evaluation of campaign goals) together with head of subdivision
- Collects relevant data and disseminates this data to the officers concerned.
- Identifies and initiates research partnerships to fill data gaps, is able to conduct smaller assessments through ministry structure.
- In close cooperation with regional campaign coordinators, undertakes field visits to evaluate impacts, gathers and processes feedback from target groups and regions

Reports to:
Head of subdivision/deputy director, event and mass media coordinators

Background:
Social sciences or market research, familiar with qualitative and quantitative research processes, outstanding analytical thinking, good report writing and presentation skills

Campaign Coordinator Regions
It will not be possible to employ four campaign coordinators for the regions at this point in time. Yet, the importance of strengthening the reach of campaigns into the regions justifies even with limited funds to employ two regional coordinators (for the northern and southern regions). As the campaign coordinators will spend a substantial amount of their work time in the regions, two officers will be a minimum number to ensure that at least one officer is always available. Duties would include:

- Ensure campaign implementation in the regions through close contact with regional offices and media and event coordinators.
- Supervision and support of activities on regional level, involves regular travel to the regions and extensive communication with regional officers from headquarters.
- Gathering and representation of regional feedback and input in the campaign and material development processes.
- If funds permit: facilitation of regular regional staff meetings.
- Processing of regional activity reports in condensed feedback for superior officers.
**Reports to:**
Head of subdivision, media/event coordinators

**Ideal background:**
Familiar with regions assigned to, background in field worker, good administrative skills, reporting skills

**Campaign Writer:**
To fill one of the key capacity gaps, it was suggested to employ a writer for IEC and mass media campaign materials. If a fully qualified writer could not be attracted, training on the job was envisaged. This could be done through technical assistance and guidance from the Director and the Namibia Review editor as time permits. The writer would also support Namibia Review and media advocacy activities.

**Reports to:**
Coordinator media, editor Namibia Review

**Ideal background:**
Journalism, advertising writer or similar

**Distribution Officer:**
The distribution officer would be necessary if the Directorate’s library was to take on the dissemination of all Take Control materials. It was suggested to move the UN volunteer currently tasked with distribution at UNICEF to the Ministry. Duties would include:

- Processing of material orders or training of messenger to process orders and supervision of order process
- Maintenance of address and order database, preparation of regular mailings in cooperation with media campaign and regional coordinators
- Maintenance of distribution partnerships, identifies potential for new partnerships.
- Monitoring of material flows and regular reporting on distribution data.

**Reports to:**
Head of subdivision, regional and media campaign coordinator

**Ideal background:**
Familiarity with databases, good communication and presentation skills

**Financial Assistant**
The Directorate is handling substantial amounts of outside funds. To increase control and reporting over these funds, it has been suggested to employ a financial assistant for documentation. Next to the finance unit at head office, the financial assistant would perform an added control function within the Directorate. Duties would include:
Support to the finance unit at head office.

Documentation of and accounting for all outside funds used.

Follow up on reporting and documentation with regional offices and other recipients of outside funds.

Training of all project management staff to improve documentation of expenditure.

Reports to:
Deputy director, head of supply services unit

Ideal background:
Diploma in accounting, experience in public service and/or with the UN system, good communication and presentation skills

Addressing staff issues

The Directorate’s team had been open and constructive in brainstorming how new staff could contribute to a better performance in the management of campaigns. Yet, some scepticism persisted: During the session, it was argued again that even with some more funds available to advertise for additional staff, low salary scales would remain a problem in attracting suitably qualified personnel. Also, staff retention and motivation would remain major issues. It was thus concluded that there remains a need for MIB to lobby Government not only to budget sufficient positions for the Directorate to live up to its commitments but also to advocate for information workers to be paid equally well as staff with comparable duties in other line ministries. It was felt that at the core of lower remuneration was a depreciation of information work in the public service and that it was high time to communicate what the contributions of MIB’s Direc- torates PM and AVM to national development are. Even if the Global Fund would bring some temporary relief, the group agreed that the process of advocating for adequate staff resources needs to be stepped up with immediate effect.

In the meantime, training was needed to compensate for qualification gaps. Strongly encouraged was the study grant proposal that is currently discussed. Training courses were also seen as a good tool. It must be noted, however, that it must be carefully evaluated what training is indispensable for what staff and at what time. In the past, the Directorate’s capacity to perform core duties has been compromised because of the few management staff taking leave for longer periods of training. In this context, training “on the job”, for instance through technical assistance, would make sense. However, further technical assistance will have to focus primarily on the transfer of skills and the conditions where such a transfer can take place have to be created. So far, technical assistants have too often filled in on vacant posts without any counterpart staff to train.
Annex:
Sources and Interviews
I. Sources

II. Interviews

Take Control partners and stakeholders

UNFPA
Kemal Mustafa

UNICEF
Rick Olson (via e-mail)

UNAIDS
Gloria Billy

National AIDS Coordination Programme (NACOP)
Elizabeth Kauna Aupindi, Sarah Tobias

HIV & AIDS Management Unit
Walter Nel

Johns Hopkins Center for Communication Programmes
Nahum Gorelick

Catholic AIDS Action
Lucy Steinity, Paulina

Social Marketing Association
Libet Maloney

NaSoMa
Maria Nangolo Rukoro, Hosky

Aids Care Trust
Gabriel Augustus, Sara

Lironga Eparu
Conný Samaria

The Namibian
Christof Maletzky, Carmen Honey

NBC Radio & Television
Claudie likela, Nathan Kapofi
UNAM Radio
Kingo Mchombu, Bongani

Radio Energy
Gerald Johr
Ombetja Yehinga
Philippe Talavera

Ministry of Information & Broadcasting

Mocks Shivute
Permanent Secretary

Rianne Selle
Director Print Media

Tarah Shinavene
Director Audio Visual Media

Pauline Nanjebo
Control Information Officer (Support Services)

Fednedy Kabunga
Chief Information Officer (Population IEC)

Elizabeth M’ule
Editor (Namibia Review)

Peter Plappert
Development Worker (Take Control)

Rita Joao
Information Officer (Take Control)

Cosmos Sibeso
Information Officer (Katima Mulilo)

Sylvia Swartz
Information Officer (Otjiwarongo)

Anton Isaacks
Information Officer (Keetmanshoop)

William Mbangula
Information Officer (Oshakati)
Immanuel Thomas
Graphic Artist (Namibia Review)

Gertrude Uupindi
Librarian

Engelhardine Mutjavikue
Clerk

Lollo Isaacs
Clerical Assistant

Sharon Böck
Clerical Assistant/Typist

**With additional support from:**

Evelyne Hansen
Personnel Unit

Pakkie Handunge
IT Officer